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Abstract:    
What,  how,  and  why  did  Comparative  Political  Economy  (CPE)  lose  sight  of  the  sources  of  
growing  macro-­‐economic  and  political  instability?  Those  political  and  economic  problems  encompass  a  
growing  financial  bubble  and  then  crash  in  the  housing  market,  a  period  of  sluggish  growth  that  
plausibly  constitutes  secular  stagnation,  and  a  crisis  of  political  legitimacy  manifesting  itself  in  the  rise  of  
anti-­‐system  ‘populist’  parties.  A  gradual  shift  in  CPE’s  research  agenda  from  macro-­‐economic  to  micro-­‐
economic  concerns,  and  from  demand-­‐side  to  supply  explanations,  diminished  CPE’s  ability  to  
adequately  analyze  the  central  economic  and  political  problems  of  the  past  20  years.  We  trace  this  
evolution  through  successive  ‘supermodels’  that  constituted  core  research  foci  for  CPE.  To  understand  
the  current  crises  CPE  needs  to  revisit  and  update  its  original  roots  in  Keynes,  macro-­‐economics,  and  the  
demand  side.  This  is  already  happening  at  the  margins,  as  CPE  scholars  struggle  to  understand  the  
current  crisis.  
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Thinking  about  thinking  about  comparative  political  economy:  from  macro  to  micro  and  back  
  
Scientific  analysis  is  not  simply  a  logically  consistent  process  that  starts  with  some  
primitive  notions  and  then  adds  to  the  stock  in  some  straight-­‐line  fashion.  It  is  not  
simply  progressive  discovery  of  some  objective  reality  –  as  is,  for  example,  discovery  in  
the  basin  of  the  Congo.  Rather  it  is  an  incessant  struggle  with  creations  of  our  own  and  
our  predecessors’  minds  and  it  ‘progresses’,  if  at  all,  in  a  criss-­‐cross  fashion,  not  as  logic,  
but  as  the  impact  of  new  ideas  or  observations  or  needs,  and  also  as  the  bents  and  
temperaments  of  new  men,  dictate.    
      Joseph  Schumpeter1    
  
Overview  
What,  how,  and  why  did  Comparative  Political  Economy  (CPE)  lose  sight  of  the  sources  of  the  
growing  macro-­‐economic  and  political  instability  marking  the  past  two  decades?  Those  political  and  
economic  problems  encompass  a  growing  financial  bubble  and  then  crash  in  the  housing  market,  
sluggish  growth  that  plausibly  constitutes  secular  stagnation,  and  a  crisis  of  political  legitimacy  
manifesting  itself  in  the  rise  of  anti-­‐system  ‘populist’  parties.  We  argue  that  CPE  reflected  and  reacted  to  
changes  in  the  economy  by  generating  a  series  of  economic  governance  ‘supermodels’  –  stylized  
accounts  of  what  CPE  argued  was  the  optimal  institutional  form  and  policies  for  economic  governance.  
These  models  typically  arose  owl  of  Minerva-­‐like  just  as  their  real  world  referent  reached  the  dusk  of  its  
optimal  performance.  The  subsequent  deterioration  of  a  given  supermodel’s  performance  then  set  a  
series  of  critiques  in  motion.  Thus,  CPE  as  a  body  of  knowledge  traveled  down  a  quasi-­‐kuhnian  path,  in  
which  efforts  to  account  for  anomalies  generated  new  research  fields  with  scope  conditions  that  
excluded  older  knowledge.  Over  the  past  five  decades  this  loss  of  knowledge  gradually  diminished  CPE’s  
ability  to  adequately  analyze  the  central  economic  and  political  problems  that  emerged  during  the  past  
two  decades.    
What:  CPE’s  core  analytic  models  gradually  shifted  from  focusing  predominantly  on  how  macro-­‐social  
actors  tamed  the  “violence  of  the  market,”  to  focusing  on  the  emergence  of  stable  institutional  equilibria  
through  the  market.2  Second,  CPE  lost  sight  of  the  role  of  emotion  and  legitimacy  in  politics,  as  its  core  point  
of  entry  shifted  from  the  legitimacy  of  state  policies  that  structured  income  distribution  and  the  rate  of  
growth,  and  towards  transaction  cost  based  analyses  of  how  actors  efficiently  coordinated  exchanges.  Finally,  
CPE’s  attention  shifted  from  a  predominantly  macro  oriented,  demand-­‐side  focus  which  included  a  keen  
understanding  of  the  fallacy  composition  in  the  creation  of  demand,  toward  a  predominantly  supply-­‐side  
focus  largely  ignoring  the  sources  of  demand.  All  these  shifts  were  a  matter  of  degree,  rather  than  absolute  
losses.  Indeed,  one  point  of  stability  was  a  continuing  focus  on  manufacturing  in  CPE’s  core  models  even  as  
other  sectors  became  more  important  for  value  creation  and  capture  in  the  economy.  A  second  point  of  
stability  was  a  continued  focus  on  national  economies  even  as  globalization,  for  lack  of  a  better  word,  
occurred,  magnifying  the  fallacies  of  composition  around  disinflation  and  export  success.  But  these  shifts  and  
their  related  loss  of  knowledge  –  which  paralleled  the  economics  discipline  –  gradually  blinded  CPE  to  macro-­‐
level  mechanisms  and  legitimacy  concerns.  CPE’s  eventual  focus  on  institutional  stability  blinded  it  to  the  
broader  instability  arising  from  flagging  demand,  volatile  and  globally  integrated  housing  finance  markets,  
and  declining  social  legitimacy.  These  evident  failures  –  CPE’s  inability  to  produce  timely  advice  about  
stabilizing  the  economy  –  have  produced  a  return  to  some  of  the  concerns  Andrew  Shonfield  first  raised  at  
the  dawn  of  modern  CPE.  
                                               
1  Joseph  Schumpeter,  History  of  Economic  Analysis,  (London:  Allen  and  Unwin,  1954),  4.  
2  Andrew  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1965),  66.  
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How:  These  three  shifts  occurred  as  both  continuous  and  discrete  processes.  The  discrete  
changes  are  best  seen  in  the  succession  of  national  institutional  configurations  that  CPE  identified  as  the  
ideal  model,  or  as  we  will  call  them,  supermodel,  for  economic  governance.  Here  we  focus  on  American  
fordism,  Swedish  and  German  corporatism,  Japanese  developmental  statism,  and  the  two  
complementary  worlds  of  liberal  and  coordinated  market  economies  in  Varieties  of  Capitalism.  All  
briefly  were  the  fashionable  institutional  supermodel.  Each  displaced  the  prior  model,  albeit  with  some  
overlap,  although  the  transition  out  of  Varieties  remains  unclear.  Each  supermodel  linked  specific  
institutional  configurations  to  specific  desirable  economic  outcomes.  In  this  sense,  each  supermodel  was  
both  a  normative  ideal  and  an  idealized  model  –  a  goal  to  be  pursued  and  a  stylized  model  for  explaining  
how  things  worked,  or  didn’t  work,  in  modern  economies.    
Why:  First,  something  like  kuhnian  science  occurred.3  As  the  real  world  changed,  political  
economists  sought  to  explain  anomalies  in  their  understanding  of  that  world.  This  process  of  addressing  
anomalies  produced  new  knowledge.  Yet,  as  Kuhn  argues,  all  new  approaches  involve  some  loss  of  old  
knowledge.  The  analytic  shift  from  legitimacy  to  transaction  costs  and  from  demand-­‐side  to  supply-­‐side  
drove  the  gradual  loss  of  established  knowledge  about  Keynes’  fallacy  of  composition4  and  about  the  
social  purpose  of  the  economy.  The  fallacy  of  composition  and  a  sense  of  the  social  and  moral  
underpinnings  for  the  economy  were  critical  components  of  CPE  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  As  SM  Amadae  
has  shown,  one  factor  driving  the  shifts  we  identify  stem  from  a  shift  in  public  funding  towards  
approaches  that  shaped  knowledge  in  directions  that  accelerated  these  losses.5  Restoring  lost  
components  requires  new  models.  CPE  scholars  confronting  the  current  crisis  are  already  generating  
some  provisional  shifts  back  towards  the  demand  side  and  the  macro-­‐economy.      
Conceptually,  none  of  these  shifts  qualify  as  full-­‐fledged  kuhnian  paradigm  shifts.  A  sociology  of  
science  scholar  might  correctly  say  that  CPE  by  itself  is  the  right  level  of  abstraction  to  apply  the  
paradigm  label.  Authoritative  reviews  of  CPE  treat  it  as  a  paradigm  with  three  different  analytic  
approaches.6  On  this  view,  the  shifts  between  supermodels  looks  like  intra-­‐paradigmatic  change.  
However  in  the  shift  from  one  supermodel  to  the  next,  scholars  converged  on  a  set  of  questions,  used  
shared  assumptions  to  answer  those  questions,  and  then  gradually  shifted  over  to  a  new  set  of  
questions,  assumptions,  and  answers  to  deal  with  accumulating  anomalies.  In  important  respects,  this  
reflects  the  kind  of  social  construction  and  evolution  of  knowledge  that  Kuhn  analyzed,  albeit  at  a  lower  
level  of  abstraction.  So  we  will  use  Kuhn  metaphorically  to  capture  the  academic  process  in  which  the  
CPE  community  shifted  from  one  supermodel  to  another.7    
Second,  in  the  non-­‐academic  world,  supermodels  are  part  of  larger  debates  informing  political  
positions  in  struggles  over  public  policy.  Space  limits  prevent  a  full  consideration  of  the  degree  to  which  
                                               
3  Thomas  Kuhn,  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1962).  
4  John  Maynard  Keynes,  General  Theory  of  Employment,  Interest  and  Money  (London:  MacMillan,  1936).  Most  
generally,  the  fallacy  of  composition  is  the  assumption  that  something  which  is  true  of  or  for  part  of  a  whole,  
characterizes  or  is  true  for  the  entire  whole.  Keynes’  fallacy  of  composition:  Individually  rational  economic  
behavior  (like  excessive  savings)  can  produce  collectively  irrational  outcomes  (inadequate  demand  leading  to  
economic  downturns  that  destroy  those  savings).  Similarly,  not  all  countries  can  run  export  surpluses.  
5  Sonja  Amadae,  Rationalizing  Capitalist  Democracy:  The  Cold  War  Origins  of  Rational  Choice  Liberalism  (Chicago:  
University  of  Chicago  Press,  2003).  
6  See  for  example  Mark  Blyth,  “Political  Economy,”  in  Mark  Lichbach  and  Alan  Zuckerman,  eds.,  Comparative  
Politics:  Rationality,  Culture,  and  Structure  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2009).  
7  Wolfgang  Streeck,  “Varieties  of  Varieties:  ‘VoC’  and  the  Growth  Models,”  Politics  &  Society  44,  no.  2  (2016):  243-­‐
247,  also  suggests  a  kuhnian  approach  to  understanding  the  internal  evolution  of  the  varieties  of  capitalism  
approach.  
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these  ideas  generate  endogenous  sources  of  decay  in  that  model.8  Actors  in  the  political  economy  strive  
to  imitate  whatever  is  the  socially  accepted  best  practice  for  policy  and  behavior.  They  do  so  by  
emulating  the  shared  understanding  of  those  policies  and  behaviors,  which  may  well  be  only  partially  
accurate  explanations.  In  each  supermodel’s  real  world  referent,  initial  success  rested  on  the  presence  
of  some  abundant  and  therefore  cheap  material  and  social  resources  that  powered  growth;  growth  in  
turn  created  the  illusion  of  stability;  stability  encouraged  actors  to  continue  exploiting  those  resources.  
Emulation  of  each  given  supermodel  by  other  national  actors  created  excess  claims  on  the  cheap  
resources  powering  that  supermodel,  exhausting  them.  Exhaustion  could  take  the  form  of  price  shocks  
or  deviant  (from  the  point  of  view  of  the  model)  human  behavior.  This  undoes  the  processes  that  made  
the  original  model  a  somewhat  accurate  representation  of  the  world,  just  as  they  did  in  MacKenzie’s  
canonical  example  of  Black-­‐Scholes  option  pricing.9  As  each  successful  real  world  economy  increasingly  
failed  to  cope  with  its  changed  environment,  CPE  reacted  by  updating  what  constituted  its  ideal  model.  
Indeed,  it  lost  sight  of  the  utility  of  the  fallacy  of  composition  for  understanding  this  generic  process.10  
This  article  thus  analyses  the  long  term  shifts  in  CPE  that  eventually  blinded  it  to  the  last  two  
decades  of  economic  and  political  turmoil.  It  demonstrates  the  shift  from  demand-­‐  to  supply-­‐side  focus,  
the  shift  in  imputed  actor  motivations  from  legitimacy  issues  to  transaction  costs,  and  the  shift  in  
baseline  assumptions  about  the  market  from  skepticism  about  stability  based  in  the  fallacy  of  
composition  to  belief  in  efficient  and  stable  equilibria  by  examining  the  content  of,  and  transitions  
between,  five  important  CPE  supermodels.  The  first  section  defines  and  explains  transitions  between  
supermodels.  Subsequent  sections  consider  five  major  supermodels  stretching  from  the  1960s  to  the  
2000s.  These  sections  show  how  changes  in  both  independent  and  dependent  variables  in  these  
supermodels  led  to  the  shifts  noted  above.  The  final  section  addresses  the  consequences  of  these  shifts  
and  losses,  while  noting  that  CPE’s  inability  to  adequately  assess  the  current  conjuncture  is  already  
inducing  a  movement  back  towards  macro-­‐social  and  macroeconomic,  demand-­‐side,  and  legitimacy  
issues.  
  
What’s  a  CPE  supermodel?  
Over  the  past  60  years,  the  main  stream  of  CPE  debates  over  economic  governance  has  moved  
forward  partly  through  a  sequence  of  and  superposition  of  different  economic  supermodels.  
Supermodels  are  meta-­‐analyses  that  causally  link  governance  institutions  to  economic  outcomes  and  
thus  serve  as  a  focal  point  for  analysis.  Each  model  differs  significantly  with  respect  to  what  the  model  
defines  as  the  relevant  policy  problem  confronting  actors,  and  which  governance  institutions  matter  for  
social  action.  Three  things  give  supermodels  a  ‘meta’  status  relative  to  typical  CPE  analyses.  First,  
supermodels  generally  claim  that  the  institutional  configuration  of  a  specific  country  or  small  number  of  
similar  countries  constitutes  a  best  practice,  indeed  universal  solution  to  what  is  implicitly  or  explicitly  
seen  as  the  most  significant  economic  governance  problem  of  the  day.    
Second,  supermodels  open  up  a  research  agenda;  by  definition  this  means  that  they  attract  
much  attention  and  generate  many  citations  and  publications.  Even  when  dissenters  criticize  the  model,  
they  honor  it,  increasing  its  salience  in  the  literature.  In  this  article,  we  bring  forward  only  partial  
evidence  for  this  attention  or  preeminence  within  CPE  debates.  Yet  we  think  that  there  is  some  
consensus  around  the  salience  of  the  five  supermodels  selected  here.  For  example,  Google  Scholar  
                                               
8  This  endogenous  decay  is  one  kind  of  Barnesian  performativity;  Donald  MacKenzie,  An  Engine,  not  a  Camera:  
How  Financial  Models  Shape  Markets  (Cambridge  MA:  MIT  Press,  2008).  
9  Ibid.  
10  These  processes  also  underlie  the  dynamics  identified  in  Hyman  Minsky,  “The  Financial  Instability  Hypothesis,”  
(Bard,  NY:  Levy  Institute  Working  paper  #74,  1992);  George  Soros,  The  Alchemy  of  Finance  (New  York:  Wiley,  
2003).  
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shows  over  12,000  citations  to  Hall  and  Soskice,  Varieties  of  Capitalism,  2300  to  Andrew  Shonfield,  
Modern  Capitalism,  and  7800  to  Chalmers  Johnson,  MITI  and  the  Japanese  Miracle  as  of  July  2017.11  
These  are  extremely  large  numbers  compared  to  the  average  publication,  which  is  lucky  to  garner  low  
double-­‐digit  citations  over  a  decade,  and  very  large  compared  to  the  lifetime  citation  figures  for  a  typical  
American  academic’s  entire  oeuvre.    
Finally,  unlike  much  CPE  writing,  supermodels  are  picked  up  by  journalists,  think  tanks  and  
public  intellectuals  and  deployed  in  mainstream  policy  debates.12  Precisely  because  they  make  claims  
about  the  best  form  of  economic  governance,  supermodels  attract  attention  from  policy  elites  seeking  
solutions  to  problems,  and  from  public  intellectuals  searching  for  the  next  big  thing.  For  example,  
Chalmers  Johnson’s  arguments  about  the  Japanese  developmental  state  underlay  efforts  at  an  openly  
interventionist  industrial  policy  by  the  so-­‐called  Atari  Democrats  of  the  1980s,  and  later  the  Clinton  
administration’s  more  covert  industrial  policy.13    
Each  supermodel  identified  a  set  of  social  or  state  institutions  driving  successful  economic  
outcomes,  and  by  implication  different  or  missing  institutions  driving  unsuccessful  ones.  For  example,  
CPE  models  have  focused  on  the  ideal  structure  for  collective  bargaining  or  capital-­‐labor  relations,  for  
the  relationship  between  the  state  and  firms,  for  the  relationship  between  the  financial  sector  and  non-­‐
financial  firms,  for  relationships  among  non-­‐financial  firms,  for  gender  relations  and  female  employment  
(though  often  only  implicitly),  and,  ultimately,  for  the  causal  mechanisms  that  produce  the  model’s  
positive  outcome(s).  Supermodels  generally  combine  many,  if  not  all  of  these  features  into  one  model,  
albeit  while  emphasizing  one  or  two  features.    
Although  all  of  the  supermodels  attend  to  macro-­‐economic  outcomes  like  growth  and  
employment  in  a  general  way,  they  differ  in  their  assumptions  about  what  makes  economies  work,  and  
this  motivates  them  to  examine  differing  causal  mechanisms.  For  example,  the  supermodels  as  analytic  
constructs  differ  in  their  relative  focus  on  demand-­‐side  and  supply-­‐side  factors.  A  focus  on  demand  is  
connected  to  macro-­‐economics  for  historical  reasons.  A  demand-­‐side  focus  does  not  assume  that  Say’s  
law  works,  but  rather  takes  the  level  of  aggregate  demand  as  an  output  of  a  political  process,  which,  per  
Keynes,  induces  an  expansion  of  supply.  By  contrast,  a  supply-­‐side  focus  does  not  black  box  firms  and  
labor  supply,  but  rather  asks  what  explains  the  kinds  of  goods  or  labor  market  a  given  institutional  
complex  generates,  what  kinds  of  production  processes  firms  utilize,  and  the  level  of  efficiency  in  
production.  Efficiency  concerns  link  the  supply  side  and  micro-­‐economic  approaches.    
However,  this  concern  with  efficiency  increasingly  obscured  the  importance  of  what  Keynes  saw  
as  a  major  fallacy  of  composition  around  the  level  of  demand  in  the  economy:  increased  efficiency  
without  increased  demand  might  simply  lead  to  self-­‐sustaining  falling  employment.  Similarly,  even  as  
globalization  made  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  the  supermodel’s  constitutive  units  
(national  economies)  and  the  global  economic  system  ever  more  important,  all  the  supermodels  from  
Corporatism  onwards  presented  competitiveness  rather  than  balancing  supply  and  demand  as  the  
crucial  economic  issue.  So  a  Keynesian  fallacy  of  composition  around  demand  reemerged  at  the  
international  level:  One  state’s  export  surplus  and  excess  savings  is  another  state’s  current  account  
deficit  and  borrowing  on  international  capital  markets.  Third,  differing  beliefs  about  the  inherent  
stability  of  the  market  also  parallel  the  methodological  split  between  Keynesian  macro-­‐economic  and  
                                               
11  Data  from  Google  Scholar  on  1  July  2018,  with  some  non-­‐standard  citations  aggregated  into  the  main  count.  
Note  that  Shonfield’s  numbers  are  deflated  by  publication  well  before  the  internet  era  as  well  as  the  process  of  
forgetting  described  here.  David  Samuels,  “Book  Citations  Count,”  PS:  Political  Science  &  Politics  46,  no.  4  (2013):  
785-­‐790,  claims  roughly  90  %  of  cited  political  science  articles  get  fewer  than  20  lifetime  citations.    
12  For  example,  John  Kenneth  Galbraith,  The  New  Industrial  State  (New  York:  Houghton  Miflin,  1967).  
13  Fred  Block  and  Matthew  Keller,  eds.  State  of  Innovation:  The  US  Government's  Role  in  Technology  Development  
(London:  Routledge,  2015).  
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Chicago-­‐school  micro-­‐founded  assumptions  about  stability.  Finally,  supermodels  diverge  in  their  theory  
of  human  nature,  with  some  emphasizing  actors’  sense  of  justice  and  equity  while  others  emphasize  
efficiency  and  coordination.14    
Although  the  evolution  of  CPE  had  elements  conforming  to  the  standard  model  of  scientific  
progress,  successive  supermodels  were  not  formed  and  discarded  solely  on  the  basis  of  a  one-­‐
directional  relationship  between  real  world  developments,  scientific  labor  and  knowledge  accumulation.  
Instead,  new  supermodel  discourses  emerged  and  became  obsolete  in  a  complex  social  process  
reflecting  at  least  three  distinct  dynamics.  The  first  is  ecological  or  material,  in  two  broad  senses:  it  
reflects  what  was  going  on  in  the  real  world,  and  it  addresses  the  social  and  physical  resources  available  
for  exploitation.  Countries  differ  in  their  institutional  capacity  to  use  available  cheap  and  abundant  
resources  –  e.g.  docile  semi-­‐skilled  labor,  ‘costless’  dumping  of  pollutants,  or  cheap  oil.  Countries  also  
differ  in  their  institutional  capacity  for  handling  whatever  seems  to  be  the  most  salient  current  
economic  problem  –  e.g.  unemployment,  inflation,  or  export  performance.  Those  best  adapted  are  
typically  lauded  as  the  model  economy,  producing  social  and  market  pressure  to  emulate  them.  We  can  
see  this  in  the  steady  stream  of  OECD  publications  urging  conformity  with  some  new  best  governance  
practice,  or  more  strongly  in  the  Marshall  Plan-­‐mediated  but  partial  transfer  of  American  consumption,  
production,  and  collective  bargaining  norms  to  Europe  and  Japan  after  1948.15    
Indeed,  post-­‐war  CPE  in  some  sense  starts  by  ‘forgetting’  that  transfer,  and  the  related  
suppression  or  disappearance  of  the  models  of  political,  economic,  and  social  order  contending  for  
dominance  in  the  1920s  and  1930s.  Those  decades  saw  contestation  among  Catholic  and  other  forms  of  
corporatism,  Fascism,  different  flavors  of  social  democracy,  liberal  capitalism,  continued  nineteenth-­‐
century  imperialism,  and  communism,  to  name  only  the  major  options.  In  this  sense,  pre-­‐war  ‘CPE’  was  
more  about  the  ‘P,’  alternative  models  for  political  regimes,  than  about  the  ‘E.’  Purported  1930s  
supermodels  varied  more  significantly  on  the  political  dimension  than  the  economic,  to  the  extent  that  
these  can  be  separated.  
The  war  shrank  this  into  an  essentially  frozen  contest  between  US-­‐style  democratic  capitalism  
and  Soviet-­‐style  communism.  Mirroring  the  ‘three  worlds’  in  the  real  world,  the  emerging  field  of  CPE  
divided  into  a  comparative  communism  sub-­‐discipline,  the  CPE  examined  here,  and  analyses  of  
development.  Among  CPE’s  of  advanced  industrial  countries,  the  US  supermodel  was  the  obvious  choice  
for  emulation,  albeit  tempered  by  substantial  domestic  pressure  for  social  protection  on  the  one  side  
and  American  re-­‐engineering  of  their  domestic  politics  via  the  Marshall  plan  and  electoral  interference    
on  the  other.16  Forward-­‐looking  European  automobile  firms  were  already  emulating  US  production  and  
advertising  practices  before  the  war.17  Post-­‐war,  US  economic  and  military  dominance  made  it  the  
default  model  for  capitalism.  States  pressured  their  firms  -­‐  above  all  automobile  manufacturers  -­‐  to  
emulate  US  practices,  while  carrying  over  aspects  of  wartime  economic  planning.  
This  institutional  isomorphism  by  non-­‐supermodel  economies  shifted  their  economies  toward  a  
greater  use  of  the  currently  cheap  and  abundant  social  or  material  resources  powering  whatever  
                                               
14  See,  e.g.  Blyth,  “Political  Economy.”  
15  Jonathan  Zeitlin  and  Gary  Herrigel,  eds.,  Americanization  and  its  Limits:  Reworking  US  Technology  and  
Management  in  Post-­‐war  Europe  and  Japan  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000);  Victoria  De  
Grazia,  Irresistible  Empire:  America's  Advance  through  Twentieth-­‐Century  Europe  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  
University  Press,  2009).  
16  Fred  Block,  The  Origins  of  International  Economic  Disorder  (Berkeley:    University  of  California  Press,  1977);  Kees  
Van  der  Pijl,  The  Making  of  an  Atlantic  Ruling  Class  (London:  Verso  Books,  1984);  Vibeke  Sørensen,  Denmark’s  
Social  Democratic  Government  and  the  Marshall  Plan  1947-­‐1950  (Copenhagen:  University  of  Copenhagen  Press,  
2001).    
17  De  Grazia,  Irresistible  Empire;  Frank  Costigliola,  Awkward  Dominion:  American  Political,  Economic,  and  Cultural  
Relations  with  Europe,  1919-­‐1933  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press,  1988).  
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country  gets  identified  as  the  ‘right’  solution  to  current  economic  problems,  and  thus  as  the  
supermodel.18  But  the  fallacy  of  composition  matters  here  too.  If  all  economies  try  to  use  those  material  
and  social  cheap  resources,  they  stop  being  cheap.  Successful  emulation  of  continuous  flow  automobile  
production  leads  to  oil  shortages.  Successful  expansion  of  continuous  flow  production  can  tighten  labor  
markets  and  enable  strikes  driven  by  status  issues.19  This  resource  exhaustion  in  turn  undermines  the  
material  and  social  basis  for  the  current  supermodel.  Like  the  owl  of  Minerva,  academic  supermodels  
presenting  a  coherent  understanding  of  institutional  configurations  typically  fly  off  the  press  just  as  
those  configurations  have  exhausted  their  social  and  material  basis.    
Both  Shonfield  and  Galbraith  were  already  discussing  the  isomorphism  problem  in  the  1960s,  
anticipating  elements  of  the  rational  expectations  model.20  Shonfield,  for  example,  argued  that  too  
much  or  too  little  understanding  of  a  given  economic  policy  model  would  nullify  its  utility.  Too  little  
knowledge,  and  actors  lacking  logics  of  appropriateness  would  not  be  able  to  orient  their  action  around  
that  model.21  Too  much  knowledge,  and  actors  would  necessarily  have  doubts  about  the  efficacy  of  their  
actions;  logics  of  consequence  would  break  down  via  what  we  now  label  rational  expectations  as  overly-­‐
knowledgeable  actors  began  to  game  the  system..    
It  is  important  to  note  here  that  the  supermodels  are  only  representations  of  reality  and  that  we  
are  not  claiming  below  that  any  given  supermodel  is  an  accurate  representation.  Disjuncture  between  
the  representation  and  the  actual  object  is  a  given.  So  any  given  supermodel  might  well  misrepresent  
reality  in  ways  that  go  beyond  the  usual  simplification  inherent  in  any  analytic  exercise.  Indeed,  each  
supermodel  typically  has  a  parallel  dissident  literature  arguing  that  the  institutional  features  lauded  as  
that  supermodel’s  strength  were  actually  weaknesses.  Thus,  the  ‘Japan  as  number  1’  supermodel  
literature  provoked  dissents  from,  for  example,  Friedman  and  Okimoto  over  the  relative  efficacy  of  state  
industrial  targeting  using  subsidized  capital,  and  by  van  Wolferen  over  whether  a  Japanese  state  actually  
existed.22  These  dissents  often  gathered  as  much  attention  (in  terms  of  citation  counts  and  publications)  
as  the  original  supermodel  publication.  But  these  dissents  operated  on  the  research  terrain  established  
by  the  supermodel.  
  Moreover,  a  whole  body  of  Marxist  and  marxisant  literature  dissented  from  the  entire  main  
stream  of  CPE  discussed  here.  This  literature  grew  out  of  the  French  Regulation  School,  and  its  
contemporaneous  American  cousin,  the  social  structures  of  accumulation  school.23  Unlike  the  works  
surveyed  here,  these  did  attend  to  macro-­‐economic  issues  and  particularly  the  question  of  the  quantity  
and  stability  of  demand.  This  was  particularly  true  of  Piore  and  Sabel’s  Second  Industrial  Divide,  the  only  
                                               
18  Paul  DiMaggio  and  Walter  Powell,  “‘The  Iron  Cage  Revisited’:    Institutional  Isomorphism  and  Collective  
Rationality  in  Organizational  Fields,”  American  Sociological  Review  48,  no.  2  (1983):  147-­‐60.  
19  Charles  Sabel,  Work  and  Politics:  The  Division  of  Labor  in  Industry  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1982).  
20  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism,  56;  Galbraith,  New  Industrial  State,  115-­‐117.  
21  James  March  and  Johan  Olsen,  Rediscovering  Institutions  (New  York,  NY:  The  Free  press,  1989).  
22  David  Friedman,  The  Misunderstood  Miracle:  Industrial  Development  and  Political  Change  in  Japan  (Ithaca,  NY:  
Cornell  University  Press,  1988);  Daniel  Okimoto,  Between  MITI  and  the  Market:  Japanese  Industrial  Policy  for  High  
Technology  (Palo  Alto,  CA:  Stanford  University  Press,  1989);  Karel  van  Wolferen,  The  Enigma  of  Japanese  Power  
(New  York:  Vintage  Books,  1990).  
23  Exemplary  works  are  Michel  Aglietta,  A  Theory  of  Capitalist  Regulation:  The  US  Experience  (London:  NLB,  1979);  
Samuel  Bowles,  David  Gordon,  and  Thomas  Weisskopf,  “Power  and  Profits:  The  Social  Structure  of  Accumulation  
and  the  Profitability  of  the  Postwar  US  Economy."  Review  of  Radical  Political  Economics  18,  no.  1-­‐2  (1986):  132-­‐
167;  David  Kotz,  Terrence  McDonough,  and  Michael  Reich,  eds.  Social  Structures  of  Accumulation:  The  Political  
Economy  of  Growth  and  Crisis  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1994).  There  were  also  other  European  
cousins  in  Amsterdam  –  e.g.  van  der  Pijl,  The  Making  of  an  Atlantic  Ruling  Class  –  and  Scandinavia  –  e.g.  Lars  
Mjøset,  ed.,  Norden  Dagen  Derpå  (Oslo:  Universitetsforlaget,  1986).  
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regulationist-­‐influenced  study  that  managed  to  exert  much  influence  on  mainstream  American  CPE,  
perhaps  because  it  contained  within  it  a  turn  to  the  supply  side.24    
Piore  and  Sabel,  like  the  Regulation  School,  focused  precisely  on  the  two  fallacies  of  
composition.  First,  a  fully  fordist  production  regime  was  impossible,  in  so  far  as  Fordism  required  
general  purpose  tools  and  skilled  labor  to  make  its  special  purpose  (asset  specific)  machinery.  Second,  
stabilizing  and  balancing  supply  and  demand  required  national  or  global  level  institutional  solutions  and  
did  not  naturally  grow  out  of  the  aggregation  of  micro-­‐level  actors  (firms  and  individuals).  Piore  and  
Sabel  argued  that  local  and  global  demand-­‐side  management  was  failing,  and  thus,  instead,  someone  
had  to  buffer  the  supply  side.  They  argued  that  flexible  specialization  would  make  supply  less  rigid  and  
thus  temper  both  inflation  and  unemployment.  Yet  Piore  and  Sabel’s  nascent  flexible  specialization  
supermodel  gained  little  traction  in  either  the  real  world  or  academia.  Articles  on  central  bank  
independence  appeared  at  roughly  ten  times  the  rate  of  those  on  flexible  specialization  in  eight  top  
political  science  journals,  and  while  many  Marshallian  industrial  districts  exist,  Italian  real  per  capita  
income  in  2016  was  the  same  as  in  1999,  which  dampened  enthusiasm  for  the  Italian  model.25    
We  focus  on  five  major  supermodels  out  of  the  full  range  of  CPE  supermodels  over  the  past  50-­‐
60  years.  These  are  the  organized  capitalism  literature,  the  corporatism  debate  (which  in  turn  divides  
into  two  phases),  the  developmental  state  literature,  and  the  Varieties  of  Capitalism  literature.  We  will  
use  Andrew  Shonfield’s  Modern  Capitalism,  articles  in  both  Fred  Hirsch  and  John  Goldthorpe’s  edited  
volume,  Political  Economy  of  Inflation  and  John  Goldthorpe’s  edited  volume,  Order  and  Conflict  in  
Contemporary  Capitalism,  Fritz  Scharpf’s  Games  Real  Actors  Play,  Chalmers  Johnson’s  MITI  and  the  
Japanese  Miracle,  and  Hall  and  Soskice’s  Varieties  of  Capitalism  (VoC)  as  representative,  highly  
influential  examples,  along  with  some  works  selected  from  their  penumbra  of  related  publications.  
Each  of  these  supermodels  reflected  academic  efforts  to  explicate  solutions  to  the  problems  of  a  
social  order  facing  exhaustion  at  the  end  of  the  prior  period.  Modern  Capitalism  analyzed  planned  
economies  and  collective  bargaining  as  responses  to  the  Great  Depression,  and  the  US  economy’s  slow  
growth  relative  to  Europe  during  the  1950s  and  early  1960s.  The  corporatism  literature  addressed  the  
evident  problems  in  Modern  Capitalism  literally  and  metaphorically  by  looking  at  the  collective  
bargaining  strand.  Planning  and  bargaining  interacted  to  produce  inflation  at  politically  unacceptable  
levels:  could  inflation  be  controlled?  We  divide  the  answers  into  ‘carrot’  and  ‘stick’  phases.  Meanwhile,  
the  mostly  Asia-­‐centered  developmental  state  literature  paralleling  the  Europe-­‐centered  corporatist  
literature  captured  the  supply-­‐side,  planning  strands  in  Modern  Capitalism  and  elevated  them  into  a  
central  feature  of  its  hyper-­‐interventionist  Asian  supermodels.  Varieties  of  Capitalism  sought  to  explain  
how  different  institutional  combinations  of  planning  and  collective  bargaining  characterized  a  resurgent  
United  States  and  Germany,  providing  a  better  theorized  version  of  Michel  Albert’s  distinction  between  
liberal  and  Rhenish  capitalisms.26  Finally,  some  green  shoots  of  a  macro-­‐economic,  demand  side  analysis  
have  emerged  in  response  to  the  post-­‐2008  crises,  and  to  CPE’s  inability  to  put  forward  a  compelling  
(and  hopefully  accurate)  explanation  for  those  crises  that  enables  steps  toward  a  more  stable  economy.  
Table  1  helps  orient  the  reader.  
                                               
24  Michael  Piore  and  Charles  Sabel,  Second  Industrial  Divide  (New  York:  Basic  Books,  1984).  
25  A  data  draw  on  JSTOR.org  on  13  February  2018  on  the  terms  ‘flexible  specialization’  and  ‘independent  central  
bank’  in  the  American  Political  Science  Review,  International  Organization,  World  Politics,  the  Journal  of  Politics,  
the  American  Journal  of  Political  Science,  Comparative  Politics,  Perspectives  on  Politics  and  the  British  Journal  of  
Political  Science  from  1980  to  the  relevant  JSTOR  border  (typically  2014)  brought  up  135  articles  for  the  former  and  
1732  articles  for  the  latter.  ‘Fordis*’  showed  up  in  even  fewer  articles  –  106.  ‘Developmental  state’  showed  up  in  
1200  articles.  ‘Corporatis*’  in  1242  articles.  The  journals  were  chosen  on  the  basis  of  their  presence  among  the  top  
20  journals  in  Google  Scholar  metrics  and  their  general  focus  (which  excludes,  e.g.  the  Journal  of  Common  Market  
Studies).  Comparative  Political  Studies  and  Politics  &  Society  are  not  in  JSTOR.    
26  Michel  Albert,  Capitalism  against  Capitalism  (New  York:    Basic  Books,  1993).  
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Table  1:  A  Schematic  View  
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Andrew  Shonfield  and  Modern  Capitalism  
Shonfield’s  Modern  Capitalism  presented  a  comprehensive  institutional  analysis  of  rich  country  political  
economy  in  the  post-­‐war  period.  Shonfield  effectively  explained  the  first  great  moderation:    the  
Keynesian  taming  of  the  violent  business  cycles  that  had  racked  pre-­‐1940s  economies.  In  doing  so  he  in  
effect  started  or  re-­‐started  CPE  as  a  field,  by  problematizing  the  institutional  sources  of  growth  and  
contrasting  the  growth  problems  of  the  older,  US  supermodel  against  the  relatively  better  performance  
of  the  French  and  German  economies.  Shonfield  thus  partially  departed  from  earlier  institutionalists,  
like  Thorstein  Veblen  and  John  Commons,  who  were  primarily  concerned  with  the  form  capitalist  
production  took  and  the  distributional  consequences  of  those  forms,  while  picking  up  the  growth  
                                               
27  ‘Fordism’  as  a  label  for  Shonfield  is  a  bit  anachronistic,  but  permits  a  connection  to  the  essential  problems  of  
supply-­‐demand  management  and  organized  capitalism  characteristic  of  his  era.  
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concerns  of  later  institutionalists  like  Josef  Steindl,  and,  implicitly,  Joseph  Schumpeter.28  Unlike  his  
contemporary  institutionalist,  J.  K.  Galbraith,  he  was  explicitly  comparative.29  
Shonfield  explained  how  organized  capitalism  generated  economic  stability  as  a  general  
phenomenon  in  the  Atlantic  economies  despite  variation  in  the  specific  national  macro-­‐social  actors  and  
institutions  creating  variation  in  stability,  employment  and  growth  outcomes.  Shonfield  had  a  demand-­‐
side  orientation,  showing,  as  he  put  it,  how  high  real  wages  could  also  be  consistent  with  high  
investment  levels.  What  linked  them  was  “keep[ing]  demand  constantly  at  a  very  high  level.”30  Finally,  
Shonfield  saw  maintaining  the  legitimacy  of  planning  as  the  critical  issue  in  state  organized  planning.  
This  planning  largely  addressed  manufacturing,  which  at  that  time  was  the  heart  of  the  economy.    
Shonfield  starts  with  Keynes’  main  concern,  namely  “the  problem  of  how  to  provide  
employment  for  more  people  using  a  given  stock  of  productive  assets.”31  But  he  adds  a  Schumpeterian  
concern  for  growth  and  technological  development  to  this,  as  well  as  putting  institutional  flesh  on  
Keynes’  analytically  austere  skeleton.  Coordination  at  the  level  of  the  whole  economy  produced  good  
outcomes  for  two  core  macro-­‐level  dependent  variables  constituting  the  social  purpose  of  the  economy:    
aggregate  growth  and  employment.  
How  did  Shonfield  explain  growth  and  employment?  The  summary  in  chapter  4  highlights  
expanding  international  trade,  de-­‐synchronized  business  cycles,  and  a  global  construction  boom  as  
necessary  but  not  sufficient  conditions  for  economic  stability.  Rather,  says  Shonfield,  “economic  
planning  is  the  most  characteristic  expression  of  the  new  capitalism,”  explaining  the  “success  of  the  
modern  capitalist  society  in  reversing  the  pressures  for  high  consumption  at  the  expense  of  
investment.”32  And  indeed,  in  some  of  the  most  successful  cases,  the  post-­‐war  wage  share  of  GDP  was  
lower  than  in  the  pre-­‐war  period,  despite  rapidly  rising  absolute  wages.  This  is  precisely  why  the  
’organized’  part  of  organized  capitalism  also  mattered.  Planning  required  various  social  actors  to  
cooperate  with  state  planning,  and  cooperation  could  only  come  from  organized  actors.  Centralized  
collective  bargaining  was  prerequisite  for  delineating  and  enacting  the  plans  that  tamed  the  violence  of  
the  market.  This  planning  had  to  be  seen  as  just  and  legitimate,  because  it  touched  directly  on  
distributional  issues.  Absent  a  sense  that  distribution  was  just,  and  that  today’s  wage  restraint  meant  
higher  wages  tomorrow,  planning  would  have  collapsed.33  
The  comprehensive  collective  bargaining  systems  and  far  reaching  planning  systems  Shonfield  
elucidated  determined  the  distribution  of  income  between  capital  and  labor,  and  where  new  capital  
income  would  be  invested.  Explicit  political  bargains  produced  a  predictable  income  distribution  and  
thus  produced  more  economic  stability,  validating  planned  investment.  Reciprocally,  stability  led  to  
more  growth  and  employment  by  inducing  more  investment.  Finally,  in  a  non-­‐fallacy  of  composition,  
stability  at  the  level  of  individual  economies  produced  stability  among  all  rich  economies,  with  the  
expansion  of  trade  helping  to  produce  full  employment  by  opening  up  supply  bottlenecks  in  the  pre-­‐
globalization  world  economy.  Shonfield’s  major  cases  highlight  the  relative  salience  of  legitimate  
planning  and  collective  bargaining  in  allocating  capital  and  stabilizing  demand.  Within  these  cases,  
                                               
28  Thorstein  Veblen,  The  Theory  of  Business  Enterprise  (New  York,  NY:  Scribner's,  1904);  John  Commons,  Legal  
Foundations  of  Capitalism  (New  York,  NY:  Macmillan,  1923);  Josef  Steindl,  Maturity  and  Stagnation  in  American  
Capitalism  (New  York,  NY:  NYU  Press,  1952);  Joseph  Schumpeter,  Capitalism,  Socialism,  and  Democracy  (New  York,  
NY:  Harper  and  Brothers,  1942).  Commons  and  Veblen  are  in  some  ways  closer  to  Varieties  in  terms  of  their  
explanandum.  
29  Galbraith,  The  New  Industrial  State.  
30  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism,  64.  
31  Ibid,  64.  
32  Ibid,  6,  121.  
33  Ibid,  225;  Barry  Eichengreen,  The  European  Economy  since  1945:  Coordinated  Capitalism  and  Beyond  (Princeton:  
Princeton  University  Press,  2008)  provides  a  formal  model  for  this.  
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France  is  the  clear  supermodel  of  Modern  Capitalism,  whose  animus  was  ‘why  are  the  British  unable  to  
emulate  the  French?’  and,  ‘how  can  the  Germans  plan  without  a  visible  state?’  
Shonfield  answers  those  questions  by  looking  at  how  real-­‐world,  organized  political  actors  
operated  within  logics  of  appropriateness  specific  to  each  country.  But  these  logics  had  to  be  built  
through  negotiation,  repeated  interaction,  and  successful  implementation.  Shonfield  does  not  single  out  
a  planning  tradition  in  France  as  the  source  of  this  success;  surprisingly,  the  French  initially  looked  to  
Britain  for  ideas  about  planning  as  process  and  institutions.  Rather,  he  highlights  how  French  planners  
built  consensus  among  key  actors  by  bringing  together  hand-­‐picked  representatives  from  capital,  labor  
and  consumers  to  lay  out  a  broad  scheme  for  economic  development.34  Planning  could  never  be  a  
purely  technical  exercise,  nor  could  it  be  successfully  imposed  from  the  top  down,  despite  certain  
caricatures  of  France  and  Japan.  Successful  planning  needed  economic  actors  to  grant  legitimacy  to  both  
the  means  and  ends  of  planning  in  order  to  secure  compliance  with  planning.  Shonfield’s  core  actors  
were  macro-­‐social  organizations,  like  the  French  commissions  de  modernization  and  German  employers’  
associations  rather  than  abstract  individual  firms  or  workers.  Shonfield’s  negative  cases,  the  United  
States  and  Britain,  similarly  highlight  the  legal  and  cultural  reasons  why  centralized  and  effective  union  
federations  and  employer  associations  did  not  exist,  and  thus  why  planning  agencies  had  little  apparent  
power.  Intellectually,  Shonfield  is  thus  to  VoC  as  Chandler  (1977)  is  to  Williamson  (1984);  real  actors  
operating  in  different  specific  contexts  versus  abstract  actors,  production  versus  exchange;  and  through-­‐
put  maximization  versus  transaction  cost  minimization.35  
Shonfield’s  analysis  of  planning  focused  largely  on  demand,  not  just  supply.  Thus  French  
indicative  planning  mattered  not  because  it  increased  output  and  then,  through  Say’s  Law,  that  this  
increased  physical  output  created  its  own  demand.  Rather,  planning  mattered  because  businesses  could  
count  on  reliable  demand  over  the  life  of  any  given  plan.  In  turn,  they  could  then  plan  and  execute  their  
own  investments,  stimulating  aggregate  demand.  Planning  created  its  own  demand  in  advance  of  
supply,  operating  through  demand-­‐pull  rather  than  supply-­‐push.36  
   Shonfield  was  somewhat  prescient  about  the  limits  to  his  modern  capitalism.  Although  
collective  bargaining  and  planning  had  tamed  the  business  cycle,  Shonfield  did  not  believe  that  these  
things  worked  automatically.  Moreover,  maximizing  demand  ran  the  risk  of  igniting  inflation.  Planning  
required  political  “skill  and  will.”37  The  chapter  on  France,  for  example,  lingered  on  planners’  efforts  to  
get  cooperation  and  support  from  politicians.  Shonfield  thus  repeatedly  located  modern  capitalism’s  
major  vulnerability  in  a  potential  loss  of  political  legitimacy  and  normative  consensus  over  the  utility  of  
planning  and  the  distributional  outcomes  it  produced.  The  apparent  illegitimacy  of  state  intervention  in  
the  United  States  and  Britain  hindered  public  planning.  Planning  changed  the  distribution  of  income,  as  
did  inflation,  and  engineering  a  visible  change  in  the  distribution  of  income  required  a  consensus  on  the  
outcome.  Anticipating  the  subsequent  corporatism  literature,  Shonfield  noted  that  inflation  could  be  
controlled  if38  
each  of  the  main  groups,  the  wage  earners  and  the  owners  of  capital  in  various  
industries,  agree  in  advance  on  how  big  a  share  of  any  increase  they  will  expect  to  
receive  in  wages  and  profits  respectively.  But  of  course  such  an  ‘incomes  policy’  could  
not  possibly  work  without  a  basic  identity  of  view  about  the  main  objectives  of  
                                               
34  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism,  84.  
35  Alfred  Chandler,  The  Visible  Hand  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  1977);  Oliver  Williamson,  Markets  
and  Hierarchies  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1975).  
36  Eichengreen,  European  Capitalism.  
37  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism,  ch.  4  and  211-­‐219.  
38  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism,  143-­‐144;  cf  Peter  Katzenstein,  Small  States  in  World  Markets  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  
University  Press,  1985).  
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economic  and  social  policy  and  the  methods  to  be  used  to  attain  them…  To  run  a  
successful  ‘incomes  policy’  a  society  must  not  only  be  just;  it  must  immediately  be  seen  
to  be  so.    
Simply  aggregating  individual  firm  and  worker  preferences  via  the  market  would  not  produce  stability.  
   Chapter  10  and  the  two  final  chapters  of  Modern  Capitalism  dealt  with  the  decreasing  public  
accountability  of  insulated  managers,  bureaucracies,  and  economic  interest  organizations.  Shonfield,  an  
English  liberal,  worried  that  macro-­‐social  institutions  would  circumscribe  individual  liberty,  producing  
anomie  and  injustice.39  Shonfield  correctly  understood  and  predicted  the  delegitimizing  consequences  
of  this  insulation  and  the  degree  to  which  it  would  endogenously  generate  resistance.  The  late  1960s  
and  1970s  saw  explicit  challenges  from  both  left  and  right  to  centralization,  bureaucratic  control,  and  
the  standardization  and  routinization  of  life  necessary  for  successful  planning.  In  addition  to  the  
challenge  posed  by  this  loss  of  legitimacy,  a  purely  material  exhaustion  also  emerged  endogenously  as  
relatively  successful  planning  everywhere  put  pressure  on  environmental  and  energy  resources.  
The  owl  of  Minerva  flies.  Modern  Capitalism  was  published  in  1965,  on  the  eve  of  a  decade  of  
intense  strife  between  management  and  labor,  particularly  in  the  archetypically  fordist  automobile  
industry.  Fordist  era  macro-­‐economic  planning  relied  on  three  cheap  resources:    docile  semi-­‐skilled  male  
labor,  docile  female  compliance  with  housewifery,  and  docile  ex-­‐colonial  suppliers  of  cheap  oil.  
Compliance  with  collective  bargaining  rested  on  a  steady  supply  of  cooperative  –  and  increasingly  
immigrant  –  semi-­‐skilled  workers  coming  into  the  core  fordist  factories.  Success  in  generating  full  
employment  elevated  disputes  over  fair  shares,  the  monotony  of  work,  and  the  homogenization  of  the  
labor  force  into  the  great  strike  wave  of  the  1960s.40  Successful  automobilization  increased  global  
demand  for  oil.  Strikes  and  oil  price  shocks  triggered  the  kind  of  inflation  that  Shonfield’s  more  
farsighted  union  leaders  already  feared  in  the  early  1960s.41  As  Piore  and  Sabel  argued  retrospectively,  
rigid  fordist  production  systems  could  not  cope  with  the  volatile  labor  and  raw  material  markets  they  
created  through  their  own  successful  expansion.42  
Unprecedented  inflation  thus  became  the  focus  for  academic  study,  with  a  new  literature  
focusing  only  on  corporatist  collective  bargaining  replacing  Shonfield’s  modern  capitalism,  and  other  
potential  pathways  (like  flexible  specialization)  becoming  byways.  At  the  same  time,  the  surprising  
strength  of  the  Japanese  economy,  and  particularly  its  rising  share  of  international  trade,  generated  a  
separate  literature  on  planning,  with  the  developmental  state  literature  applied  mostly  to  Japan  and  
developing  Asia.  Shonfield’s  analysis  thus  split  into  two  streams  that  matured  simultaneously  and  later  
rejoined  in  the  Varieties  of  Capitalism  literature.  We  consider  the  corporatism  literature  first,  then  the  
developmental  state  literature.  Significantly,  CPE  did  not  pick  up  on  the  importance  of  women’s  revolt  
against  economic  exclusion  until  much  later,  and  even  then  largely  in  analyses  of  the  welfare  state,  and,  
in  a  disguised,  genderless  fashion,  arguments  about  the  new  service  economy.  
  
Corporatism  
Modern  Capitalism  emerged  organically  from  the  Depression  and  war  economy  experience;  the  
corporatism  supermodel  emerged  organically  from  modern  capitalism’s  inflationary  tendencies  and  the  
breakdown  of  legitimacy  in  the  great  strike  waves  of  the  1960s.  In  the  roughly  10  years  that  passed  
between  Shonfield’s  book  and  the  emergence  of  the  corporatism  literature,  inflation  and  labor  strife  
signaled  a  return  to  volatile  markets.  People  presumed  that  wage  leapfrogging  lay  at  the  heart  of  
accelerating  inflation,  so  the  supermodels  in  the  corporatism  literature  proposed  bilateral  or  trilateral  
                                               
39  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism,  227.  
40  Sabel,  Work  and  Politics.  
41  Shonfield,  Modern  Capitalism,  7-­‐8.  
42  Piore  and  Sabel,    Second  Industrial  Divide.  
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negotiation,  or  voluntary  self-­‐restraint  as  ways  to  tame  inflation  (i.e.  militancy)  in  labor  markets.  In  
short,  the  corporatism  literature  took  up  the  collective  bargaining  and  legitimacy  strands  in  Shonfield,  
emphasizing  their  operation  in  relatively  low-­‐inflation  northern  Europe.  Shonfield  addressed  collective  
bargaining’s  role  in  securing  an  equitably  distributed,  sufficient  and  stable  level  of  demand.  The  (neo-­‐)  
corporatist  supermodels,  by  contrast,  addressed  the  problem  of  stagflation.  At  an  even  deeper  level  
they  were  concerned  with  the  recreation  of  a  stable  social  order  with  docile  labor  after  the  consensus  
Shonfield  identified  had  broken  down.  Here  demand  was  not  something  to  be  maximized  in  pursuit  of  
full  employment,  but  rather  seen  as  tendentially  inflationary.  
The  corporatism  supermodel  literature  fell  into  two  phases  defined  by  the  nature  of  the  state-­‐
union  link  and  the  main  policy  objective.  Both  phases  dealt  with  efforts  to  bargain  within  existing  
institutions  or  to  change  those  institutions  in  order  to  reduce  cost-­‐push/wage-­‐push  inflation  and  restore  
shop  floor  order.  We  call  these  the  ‘carrot’  and  ‘stick’  phases,  depending  on  whether  the  state  is  using  
the  carrot  of  expanded  social  spending  or  the  stick  of  tight  monetary  policy  to  induce  cooperation  from  
unions.    
Sweden  of  the  Haga  Accords  was  seen  as  the  ideal  case  of  a  carrot  relationship  between  unions  
and  the  state.43  In  this  model,  the  state,  via  finance  ministries  largely  controlled  by  left  political  parties,  
offered  future  welfare  benefits  and  tax  cuts  in  exchange  for  wage  moderation  now.  Thus  the  state  tried  
to  induce  unions  to  moderate  wage  demands  and  to  prevent  wage  leapfrogging  by  recentralizing  
collective  bargaining.  Here  the  active  parts  of  the  state  were  the  social  welfare  and  fiscal  side,  offering  
rewards  for  good  behavior.    
Model  Germany  became  the  supermodel  for  the  stick  state  in  the  second  phase  of  the  
corporatism  literature,  reflecting  the  Bundesbank’s  extraordinary  power.  This  model  stressed  direct  
state  restraint  of  wage  demands,  with  the  state  operating  through  the  central  bank  and  securing  
compliance  using  threats  of  higher  unemployment.  Here  the  relevant  part  of  the  state  was  an  
independent  central  bank  focused  solely  on  reducing  inflation  through  a  coercive  relationship  with  
unions.    
The  corporatism  supermodels’  initial  core  concern  was  disorder.  Schmitter’s  rescue  of  the  term  
for  analytical  purposes  revived  concepts  that  emerged,  tellingly,  during  the  political  disorder  of  the  
1920s.44  But  inflation  signified  disorder  rather  than  street  fighting.  Hirsch  and  Goldthorpe  clearly  state  
the  problem:45  
In  the  past  decade,  the  problem  of  inflation  has  escalated  from  a  continuing  irritant  to  
a  blight  on  the  stability  and  efficient  performance  of  the  leading  economies  and  to  a  
potential  threat  to  the  preservation  of  democratic  societies.    ...  [I]nflation  of  the  kind  
now  endemic  in  the  noncommunist  world  is  more  than  an  economic  problem.  It  
pervades  the  political  and  social  structure  of  society  and  may  become  embedded  in  
those  structures.    
Hirsch  and  Goldthorpe  stressed  that  while  economists  were  busy  seeking  a  technical  solution  to  the  
problem  of  inflation,  only  a  political  solution  was  possible;  they  thus  preserved  the  legitimacy  strand  of  
Shonfield,  but  with  a  new  problematic.  This  tension  permeated  the  corporatism  literature,  which  shifted  
from  praising  overtly  political  solutions  for  inflation  via  the  carrot  state  to  praising  seemingly  technical  
but  covertly  political  solutions  via  the  stick  state.  In  the  CPE  literature,  this  can  be  seen  in  the  shift  from  
                                               
43  Andrew  Martin,  “Trade  Unions  in  Sweden,”  in  Peter  Gourevitch,  Peter  Lange,  and  Andrew  Martin,  eds.,  Unions  
and  Economic  Crisis:  Britain,  West  Germany  and  Sweden  (London:  Unwin  Hyman,  1984).  
44  Philippe  Schmitter  “Still  the  century  of  corporatism?”  The  Review  of  Politics  36,  no.  1  (1974):  85-­‐131.  
45  Fred  Hirsch  and  John  Goldthorpe,  eds.,  Political  Economy  of  Inflation  (London:  Martin  Richardson,  1978),  1;  see  
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Katzenstein,  who  emphasizes  a  shared  sense  of  social  purpose,  to  the  thinner  institutionalism  of  Hall  
and  Franzese,  who  reduce  politics  to  signaling.46  More  generally,  the  carrot  version  of  corporatism  
presumed  that  unions  wanted  to  cooperate,  while  in  the  stick  version  they  had  to  be  coerced.  
   Inflation  and  rising  concerns  about  export  competitiveness  were  the  surface  manifestations  for  
the  question  of  whether  the  state  could  contain  or  reduce  the  power  of  the  labor  movement,  and  thus  
generate  an  institutional  solution  to  the  inflation  problem.  Fifty  years  later  this  concern  for  union  power  
might  seem  risible.  But  in  the  1970s  the  wage  share  of  GDP  and  strike  activity  peaked  at  historically  high  
levels.  As  late  as  1984,  John  Goldthorpe  could  still  be  writing  about  the  degree  to  which  organized  labor  
posed  a  threat  to  social  stability  in  capitalist  societies;  the  title  to  his  edited  collection  starts  with  Order.  
And,  tellingly,  1983  represents  the  absolute  low  point  for  the  after-­‐tax  profit  share  in  US  GDP,  at  3  
percent  of  GDP.47    
Academically,  the  corporatism  literature  sought  to  fix  anomalies  that  did  not  fit  Shonfield’s  
analysis.  Given  the  end  of  labor  quiescence,  the  facts  had  changed,  and  so  analysts  struggled  to  
incorporate  those  facts  within  existing  arguments.  Using  additional,  newly  relevant  facts,  like  the  degree  
of  union  centralization  and  then  the  degree  of  central  bank  independence,  this  literature  evolved  
increasingly  detailed  studies  of  the  conditions  producing  social  and  macro-­‐economic  stability.  The  
corporatism  literature  picked  up  methodologically  individualist  and  micro-­‐economic  arguments  from  
Mancur  Olson’s  Logic  of  Collective  Action  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  bargaining  by  organized  
interest  groups  could  produce  stable,  positive  macro-­‐economic  outcomes.48  
Second,  while  the  corporatism  literature  was  not  initially  quantitative,  it  became  increasingly  so,  
borrowing  statistical  and  formal  modeling  techniques  from  economics  as  well  as  economic  theories  of  
politics.  The  connection  to  Olson’s  micro-­‐founded  arguments  made  this  step  easy.  This  systematic  
testing  of  hypotheses,  albeit  within  the  confines  of  an  extremely  limited  set  of  cases  and  thus  with  
enormous  problems  with  statistical  degrees  of  freedom49,  set  the  stage  for  a  shift  of  focus  to  ‘new  facts’  
about  central  bank  independence,  displacing  the  older  focus  on  unions  and  their  internal  organization.    
The  core  assumptions  in  this  research  are  intimately  connected  to  movement  away  from  
Shonfield’s  macro-­‐social  perspective.  Calmfors  and  Driffill  adapted  Olson’s  micro-­‐founded  argument  to  
explain  wage-­‐push  inflation.50  They  argued  that  differing  levels  of  union  centralization  produced  
different  levels  of  inflation,  but  in  an  inverse  ‘U’-­‐shaped  rather  than  linear  relationship.  Standard  
economic  theory  argued  that  rising  levels  of  unionization  should  cause  wage-­‐push  inflation.  Calmfors-­‐
Driffill  agreed  that  disorganized  labor  markets  should  have  no  wage-­‐push  inflation,  because  wages  
should  revert  to  marginal  productivity  for  any  given  worker.  In  organized  labor  markets,  unions,  like  any  
oligopoly,  could  use  their  control  over  the  supply  of  labor  to  push  wages  up  above  their  market  clearing  
and  pass  these  additional  costs  along  to  the  more  numerous  disorganized  workers  and  consumers.  But  
above  a  certain  level  of  centralization,  unions  pushing  wage  demands  in  excess  of  productivity  growth  
would  face  either  higher  inflation  that  wiped  out  nominal  wage  gains,  or  rising  unemployment  as  
exports  were  priced  out  of  world  markets.  Calmfors-­‐Driffill  thus  saw  economies  as  falling  into  three  
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groups,  with  inflation  highest  in  the  middle  group.  Although  this  formal  insight  did  not  emerge  until  the  
late  1980s,  it  explained  the  outcomes  that  motivated  the  choice  of  centralized  Sweden  as  a  supermodel  
in  the  1970s,  and  remains  a  central  part  of  the  later  VoC  literature.    
Sweden’s  more  or  less  encompassing  trade  union  federations,  LO  and  TCO,  enabled  bargains  
with  the  state  over  the  rate  of  growth  of  wages.  LO  represented  half  of  Sweden’s  workforce  in  the  
1970s,  so  it  could  not  externalize  wage  increases  above  productivity  growth.  Unions  could  exchange  
wage  growth  today  for  promises  of  an  increased  social  wage  in  the  future  and  policies  to  sustain  full  
employment  today.  But  could  these  unions  then  bind  their  members,  preventing  leapfrogging  and  
inertial  inflation?  Legitimacy  issues  thus  began  giving  way  to  issues  of  credibility.  Only  the  state  could  
credibly  commit  to  a  carrot  by  codifying  a  future  stream  of  payments  in  legislation.  While  business  faced  
no  such  constraint  on  its  future  behavior,  Sweden’s  tax  system  encouraged  continued  investment  and  
LO’s  strategy  in  the  1970s  aimed  at  gaining  some  measure  of  control  over  investment.51  Strong  unions  
could  thus  confidently  enter  into  these  bargains.  Business,  meanwhile,  appeared  as  a  passive  price  taker  
in  world  markets.  As  with  Shonfield’s  modern  capitalism,  the  first  phase  of  the  corporatism  literature  
captured  real  behaviors  based  on  what  turned  out  to  be  an  exhaustible  resource:    union  and  business  
organization  centralization  and  control  over  their  members.  Rank  and  file  compliance  with  wage  
restraint  and  the  erosion  of  wage  relativities  and  firm’s  tolerance  for  loss  of  autonomy  over  wage  levels  
proved  hard  to  sustain  over  time  even  in  the  paradigmatic  Nordic  economies.52  
The  stick  half  of  the  early  corporatism  literature  thus  began  in  the  mid-­‐  to  late  1980s,  as  more  
economies  began  shifting  towards  Calmfors-­‐Driffell’s  middle  position.  Here,  direct  state  efforts  to  
contain  wage  demands  operated  through  the  central  bank  and  used  the  stick  of  threats  of  higher  
interest  rates  and  increased  unemployment  to  secure  union  compliance.  Fiscal  and  social  policy  tools  
receded.  A  new  version  of  Model  Germany  –  the  old  one  emphasized  production  and  export  excellence  
–  centered  on  inflation  performance  and  exchange  rate  strength  gradually  emerged  as  the  clear  
supermodel  for  this  phase,  paralleling  the  emergence  of  the  Maastricht  criteria  in  the  European  Union.    
In  a  series  of  sophisticated  analyses,  Fritz  Scharpf  provided  both  the  intellectual  bridge  between  
the  carrot  and  stick  state  literatures  and  also  to  the  VoC  literature.53  Scharpf  contrasted  the  dramatic  
differences  in  inflation  and  employment  performance  during  the  turbulent  1970s  among  Britain,  
Germany,  Sweden  and  Austria.  He  argued  that  steering  between  the  Charybdis  of  punitive  austerity  and  
tight  money  and  the  Scylla  of  cost-­‐push  inflation  required  wage  moderation  plus  coordination  across  key  
policy  areas.  When  inflation  was  cost-­‐push,  and  unemployment  was  partly  a  result  of  insufficient  
demand,  wage  moderation  could  open  up  room  for  demand  stimulation  by  curbing  cost-­‐push  effects  
and  boosting  productivity  and  investment.  For  Scharpf,  Austria’s  relative  success  rested  on  trust  that  the  
social  partners  would  deliver  on  their  commitments  to  wage  moderation  and  investment.54  By  contrast,  
no  British  actor  could  commit,  and  the  German  Bundesbank  actively  distrusted  unions  and,  less  so,  
business.  Scharpf  dismissed  the  former  Swedish  Haga  supermodel  because  neither  the  state  nor  central  
                                               
51  Martin,  “Trade  Unions  on  Sweden”;  Jonas  Pontusson,  The  Limits  of  Social  Democracy:  Investment  Politics  in  
Sweden,  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press,  1992).  
52  Sabel,  Work  and  Politics;  Peter  Swenson,  Fair  Shares:  Unions,  Pay,  and  Politics  in  Sweden  and  West  Germany.  
(Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press,  1989);  Jesper  Due,  Jørgen  Steen  Madsen,  Carsten  Strøbye  Jensen,  and  Lars  
Kjerulf  Petersen,  The  Survival  of  the  Danish  Model  (Copenhagen:    DJOF,  1994);  Jonas  Pontusson  and  Peter  
Swenson,  “Labor  Markets,  Production  Strategies,  and  Wage  Bargaining  Institutions,”  Comparative  Political  Studies  
29,  no.  2  (1996):  223-­‐250.  
53  Fritz  Scharpf,  “Economic  and  Institutional  Constraints  of  Full-­‐employment  Strategies:  Sweden,  Austria,  and  
Western  Germany,  1973-­‐1982,”  in  John  Goldthorpe,  ed.,  Order  and  Conflict  in  Contemporary  Capitalism  (Oxford:  
Clarendon  Press,  1984);  Fritz  Scharpf,  Crisis  and  Choice  in  European  Social  Democracy  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  
University  Press,  1991);  Fritz  Scharpf,  Games  Real  Actors  Play  (Boulder  CO:  Westview  Press,  1997).  
54  Scharpf,  “Economic  and  Institutional  Constraints.”    
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bank  disciplined  the  Swedish  labor  movement.  But  he  also  dismissed  Modell  Deutschland,  because  he  
saw  German  unions  in  exactly  the  opposite  position  of  the  Swedish  ones,  “compelled  by  their  own  
organizational  logic  to  pursue  strategies  that  they  considered  macro-­‐economically  rational,  [and]  no  
longer  able  to  extract  a  political  price  for  their  de  facto  collaboration.”55  Scharpf’s  analysis  rested  on  a  
tripod  built  out  of  Shonfield’s  focus  on  legitimacy,  the  corporatist  literature’s  focus  on  organizational  
capacity,  and  the  emerging  stick  state  focus  on  productivity  and  central  bank  autonomy.  
Scharpf’s  critical  stance  on  Modell  Deutschland  was  lost  as  the  economics  literature  and  then  
corporatism  literature  on  central  banks  increasingly  focused  on  inflation  targeting  regardless  of  its  
employment  and  growth  consequences.  Kydland  and  Prescott’s  elegant  but  data-­‐free  dismissal  of  
discretionary  planning  in  favor  of  rigid  rules  provided  an  intellectual  basis  for  freeing  central  banks  from  
overt  political  control,  and  for  incorporating  fixed  rules  or  targets  into  deals  like  the  Maastricht  Treaty.56  
This  completed  the  shift  from  Shonfield’s  real  actors  to  abstract  ones.    Subsequently,  leading  political  
economists  like  Peter  Hall  merged  the  corporatism  literature  with  the  growing  literature  using  the  
degree  of  central  bank  autonomy  as  its  only  independent  variable.  Hall  argued  that  the  interaction  
between  central  bank  independence  and  the  wage  determination  system  generated  inflation  outcomes.  
A  later  quantitative  article  with  Robert  Franzese  argued  that  in  the  presence  of  coordinated  bargaining,  
central  banks  could  avoid  imposing  higher  unemployment  simply  through  an  effective  signaling  
process.57  Sticks  needed  merely  to  be  shown  if  social  actors  could  work  together.    
All  of  these  corporatism  approaches  retained  a  lingering  if  limited  concern  with  demand  and  
employment,  by  contrast  to  the  Chicago  school  inspired  conventional  wisdom  that  the  only  proper  
macro  task  for  government  was  stabilizing  inflation  at  low  levels,  and  that  the  best  way  for  an  
independent  central  bank  to  achieve  any  given  inflation  target  was  inflation  targeting  monetary  policy.  
The  disinflationary  experience  of  the  second  ‘great  moderation’  in  the  1990s  reinforced  the  apparent  
validity  of  the  Chicago  approach.  Yet  it  too  was  founded  on  exhaustible  resources,  namely  political  
patience  with  rising  unemployment  and  subsequently  worsening  fiscal  deficits.  Put  simply,  in  much  of  
Europe,  squeezing  the  inflation  side  of  the  economic  balloon  caused  the  unemployment  and  fiscal  cost  
side  to  bulge  outward.  
Ironically,  the  return  of  mass  unemployment  brought  the  corporatist  literature  back  to  its  carrot  
roots  with  a  third  flavor  of  corporatist  supermodel  in  the  1990s.  The  explicitly  supply-­‐side  formula  of  
flexicurity  blended  inflation  and  employment  concerns.  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  had  a  brief  
moment  in  the  sun,  because  they  appeared  to  attain  American  employment  levels  without  the  
harshness  of  American  labor  market  norms.58  With  unions  retreating  but  with  unemployment  imposing  
great  fiscal  stress,  the  state  could  shift  back  to  employment  issues.  The  flexicurity  literature  argued  that  
robust  social  welfare  systems  and  residual  corporatist  institutions  could  combine  to  allow  labor  market  
flexibilities  that  produced  full(er)  employment.  But  all  the  action  in  flexicurity  occurred  in  the  interplay  
between  the  state’s  labor  market  policies  and  its  welfare  state  institutions,  with  unions  playing  a  much  
diminished  role.    
                                               
55  Ibid,  285.  
56  Finn  Kydland  and  Edward  Prescott,  “Rules  Rather  than  Discretion:  The  Inconsistency  of  Optimal  Plans,”  The  
Journal  of  Political  Economy  85,  no.  3  (1977):  473-­‐491.  
57  Peter  Hall,  “Central  Bank  Independence  and  Coordinated  Wage  Bargaining:  Their  Interaction  in  Germany  and  
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58  Peter  Auer,  Employment  Revival  in  Europe:  Labor  Market  Success  in  Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland,  and  the  
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Experiences  and  Lessons,”  Transfer:  European  Review  of  Labour  and  Research  10,  no.  2  (2004):  187-­‐207;  Jelle  
Visser  and  Anton  Hemerijck,  A  Dutch  Miracle:  Job  Growth,  Welfare  Reform  and  Corporatism  in  the  Netherlands  
(Amsterdam:  Amsterdam  University  Press,  1999).  
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Here,  the  shift  from  a  concern  with  cost-­‐push  inflation  to  the  unwillingness  of  firms  to  hire  in  
rigid  labor  markets  reflected  a  continuing  shift  from  the  macro  to  the  micro  level  and  from  unions  to  
firms.59  In  this  respect  the  flexicurity  model  foreshadowed  VoC’s  emphasis  on  firms.  The  entire  EU-­‐
Lisbon  jobs  strategy  was  premised  on  the  generalization  of  the  flexicurity  model  to  non-­‐Nordic  Europe.  
In  the  flexicurity  supermodel,  welfare  was  not  a  side  payment  for  wage  moderation  and  quiescence,  but  
rather  a  means  to  reduce  risks  both  for  individual  employees  and  employers  and  thus  make  labor  
markets  less  rigid.  As  an  argument,  flexicurity  was  supply-­‐side  and  micro-­‐economically  oriented.  The  
flexicurity  model  thus  exhibited  a  fallacy  of  composition  in  that  it  depended  on  sources  of  demand  
external  to  either  the  labor  market  or  its  small  European  economies  to  attain  full  employment.  Indeed,  
though  we  pick  up  this  thread  later  when  we  discuss  VoC,  the  demand  created  by  housing  booms  and  
privatized  Keynesianism  seems  to  have  had  more  to  do  with  employment  success  than  did  supply-­‐side  
reforms.60  But  before  we  turn  to  VoC  we  need  to  examine  how  the  planning  strand  in  Shonfield  turned  
into  a  pure  supply-­‐side,  micro-­‐level  argument,  equally  blind  to  the  fallacy  of  composition.  
  
The  Developmental  State  supermodel  
The  corporatism  literature  evolved  from  Shonfield’s  arguments  dealing  with  fair  shares,  collective  
bargaining,  and  the  state’s  ability  to  manage  class  conflict.  In  both  its  carrot  and  stick  phases,  this  
literature  searched  for  the  optimal  institutional  structure  to  control  inflation  without  damaging  
employment.  The  corporatism  literature  thus  analyzed  national  structures  as  quasi-­‐  or  fully  independent  
units.  In  this  sense,  it  implicitly  endorsed  at  least  part  of  Shonfield’s  simple,  Keynesian,  demand-­‐side  
view  of  the  world  even  as  the  corporatism  literature  became  increasingly  supply-­‐side  oriented  and  thus  
began  losing  sight  of  Keynes’  fallacy  of  composition  arguments  about  savings  and  demand.  
By  contrast,  the  developmental  state  literature  picked  up  the  planning  and  supply-­‐side  strands  
in  Shonfield.  This  literature  identified  first  Japan  and  then  follow-­‐on  Asian  states  as  consummate  
planners,  while  also  crediting  France  with  significant  planning  ability.  It  decisively  shifted  away  from  
Shonfield  in  two  limiting  ways.  First,  it  dropped  Shonfield’s  closed  economy  assumption.  Exports  
mattered  for  Shonfield,  but  they  mattered  because  imports  allowed  a  rapidly  growing  economy  to  
overcome  temporary  bottlenecks,  or  because  exports  allowed  a  slowing  economy  to  keep  traction.  In  
the  developmental  state  literature,  global  market  share  and  current  account  surpluses  became  if  not  the  
metric  for  success,  certainly  one  equal  with  Shonfield’s  growth  and  employment  metrics.  The  
developmental  state  literature  thus  rested  on  a  massive  fallacy  of  composition  even  as  it  adjusted  to  
ongoing  globalization.  It  assumed  demand  could  always  be  found  somewhere  out  in  the  global  
economy,  reflecting  a  shift  to  an  economic  environment  in  which  countries  did  not  necessarily  have  to  
take  responsibility  for  keeping  their  internal  demand  growth  in  line  with  their  own  productivity  growth.  
Thus,  second,  the  developmental  state  literature  decisively  shifted  toward  a  supply-­‐side  
orientation.  For  Shonfield,  the  whole  purpose  of  planning  was  to  anticipate  and  increase  output  from  
bottleneck  industries  or  services  where  future  demand  might  exceed  supply.61  Demand  came  first.  By  
contrast,  the  developmental  state  literature  explained  the  origins  of  internationally  competitive  export  
industries.  This  literature  thus  stands  midway  between  Shonfield’s  concern  for  growth  and  VoC’s  
concern  for  the  effective  coordination  of  production.  It  reflects  a  shift  from  quantity  (the  aggregate  
economy)  to  quality  (the  merits  of  specific  sectors),  and  a  partial  shift  from  control  over  finance  to  inter-­‐  
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and  intra-­‐firm  relations.  These  macro-­‐  to  meso-­‐level  shifts  helped  open  the  door  to  the  subsequent  VoC  
literature,  which  transformed  the  developmental  state  literature’s  concern  with  exports  into  the  issue  of  
distinct  export  profiles.  
Japan  was  the  developmental  state  literature’s  alpha  supermodel.  Modern  Capitalism  ignored  
Japan;  Shonfield  thought  it  sui  generis.  Though  Ezra  Vogel’s  Japan  as  Number  1  made  the  first  claim  for  
Japan’s  supermodel  status,  Chalmers  Johnson’s  analytically  richer  MITI  and  the  Japanese  Miracle  
became  the  touchstone  for  later  analysts,  whether  or  not  they  agreed  with  his  argument.62  MITI’s  title  
signals  the  macro  to  micro  shift,  as  it  linked  a  handful  of  state  agencies,  particularly  MITI  and  the  
Ministry  of  Finance,  to  a  handful  of  critical  manufacturing  industries.  Similarly,  Johnson’s  dependent  
variable  was  Japan’s  industrial  modernization  and  export  success  rather  than  growth  per  se.  Johnson’s  
book  was  part  of  a  broader  contemporaneous  wave  of  books  on  industrial  policy,  that  is,  targeted  
efforts  to  develop  competitive  industries  in  a  narrow  set  of  sectors.63  These  sector  studies  had  a  much  
smaller  ambit  than  Shonfield’s  macro-­‐economy  or  corporatism’s  macro-­‐economic  aggregates.  Inflation,  
the  core  concern  of  the  corporatism  literature,  disappeared.  Indeed,  Japanese  inflation  rates  generally  
exceeded  the  OECD  average  until  the  1980s.  Likewise,  employment  was  a  secondary  outcome  of  trade  
success.  
In  another  narrowing  of  Shonfield’s  field  of  vision,  Johnson’s  independent  variable  was  the  
shared  social  purpose  of  a  handful  of  actors  in  a  single  bureaucracy.  MITI  and  the  Japanese  Miracle  is  a  
genealogy  of  that  ethos  in  relation  to  the  targeted  use  of  finance  for  developmental  purposes.  Johnson’s  
emphasis  on  state  directed  finance  contrasted  plan-­‐rational  economies  with  market  rational  economies,  
creating  a  Pacific  version  of  the  later  Atlantic  Varieties  of  Capitalism  dichotomy.  The  critical  difference  
distinguishing  Johnson’s  two  types  was  their  ethos,  more  than  any  actual  organizational  or  legal  
differences.  But  as  with  conventional  understandings  of  Shonfield,  Katzenstein,  and  Scharpf,  much  of  
the  subsequent  literature  fastened  on  only  one  aspect  of  the  larger  argument:  the  organizational  
aspects  of  planning  and  in  particular  control  over  financial  flows.64  For  example,  two  subsequent  books  
focused  on  the  Korean  state’s  use  of  discretionary  and  contingent  financial  subsidies  to  firms  in  order  to  
induce  world  market  competitive  export  production.65    
Thus  the  normative  or  ethical  (in  the  sense  of  worldview)  side  of  Shonfield’s  argument  and  
indeed  Johnson’s  argument  was  lost  in  debates  about  whether  planning  actually  worked  and  which  
specific  organizational  technique  mattered  most.66  For  example,  one  of  Johnson’s  strongest,  albeit  
friendly  critics,  David  Friedman,  argued  that  the  outcomes  Johnson  credited  to  MITI’s  planning,  cartels,  
and  incentives  were  actually  generated  from  the  bottom  up,  and  in  opposition  to  MITI’s  vision  of  a  
consolidated,  large  firm,  fordist  economy  (which  was  MITI’s  goal  and  partially  informed  by  the  academic  
literature).67  Friedman  argued  that  Japanese  firms  succeeded  through  competitive  strategies  that  aimed  
at  breaking  up  mass  markets  into  smaller  specialized  segments  through  continuous  product  modification  
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and  new  product  development  by  small  and  medium-­‐sized  enterprises  –  an  Asian  version  of  Streeck’s  
contemporaneous  diversified  quality  production  argument.  All  of  this  is  antithetical  to  the  enterprise  
consolidation  that  Shonfield  and  Johnson  thought  necessary  for  planning.  Similarly,  Daniel  Okimoto  
raised  the  concept  of  reciprocal  consent  to  capture  the  interaction  of  state  and  business  elites,  
expanding  the  question  of  ethos  from  the  state  to  firms.68  Peter  Evans’  notion  of  ‘embedded  autonomy’  
anchored  reciprocal  consent  –  which  after  all  could  simply  be  about  corrupt  bargains  –  back  in  the  
seemingly  objective  dichotomy  between  Weberian  and  predatory  bureaucracies.69  
But  embedded  autonomy  left  three  critical  conceptual  issues  from  Shonfield  hanging.  First,  as  
Weber  himself  said,  the  state  is  ethically  neutral.  Specific  historical  circumstances  shaped  MITI’s  ethos.  
Second,  state  financed  expansion  and  consolidation  of  industry  was  inherently  inflationary  –  the  issue  
motivating  the  corporatism  literature.  So  the  developmental  state  literature  retained  a  subterranean  
link  to  the  corporatism  debate.  By  bringing  more  and  more  labor  into  assembly  line  factories,  and  by  
supplying    more  and  more  credit  to  expanding  firms,  the  state  expanded  the  potential  for  inflation.  
Large,  over-­‐indebted  firms  could  not  be  left  to  go  bankrupt  for  fear  of  negative  employment  and  output  
consequences.  As  Loriaux  argued,  this  locked  the  state  into  even  more  lending  and  thus  expansion  of  
the  money  supply.70  Simultaneously,  a  few  militant  workers  could  bring  production  to  a  halt.  This  
motivated  the  inflationary  wage  developments  in  1970s  Europe.  But  Japan,  unlike  much  of  western  
Europe,  had  labor  markets  segmented  not  only  between  core  and  peripheral  workers  but  also  between  
workers  in  different  core  firms.  It  had  already  attained  the  golden  land  of  locally  strong  but  nationally  
weak  labor  that  the  ‘stick’  corporatism  literature  identified.  Those  unions  effectively  could  not  bargain  
for  wage  increases  greater  than  productivity    growth  at  their  own  firm,  limiting  wage-­‐push  inflation.  The  
subterranean  link  to  the  corporatism  literature  hints  at  one  of  the  limits  to  the  developmental  state  
supermodel.  
In  the  real  world,  the  developmental  state  supermodel  exhausted  its  initially  abundant  
resources,  just  like  all  the  others.  Developmental  states’  success  in  generating  excessive  streams  of  
exports  –  excessive  meaning:  politically  unacceptable  in  north  America  and  western  Europe  –  provoked  
decisive  changes  in  the  domestic  and  international  environment  that  undermined  the  developmental  
state.  Domestically,  export  success  gave  rise  to  financial  deregulation  as  firms  accumulated  reserves.  
This  limited  the  state’s  ability  to  use  credit  markets  to  control  firms.  Internationally,  export  success  led  
to  market  closure  and  pressure  for  more  financial  deregulation.  So  developmental  success  eroded  the  
model  from  within  and  without.  
The  counterpart  to  Japan’s  export  surplus  was  US  trade  deficits.  These  deficits  motivated  two  
Republican  presidents,  Nixon  and  Reagan,  to  devalue  the  dollar,  liberalize  exchange  rates,  and  partially  
deregulate  finance.  In  turn,  floating  exchange  rates  revealed  the  fallacy  of  composition  aspects  of  
French  and  Japanese  export  success.  As  Loriaux  argues,  floating  rates  forced  France  to  dismantle  the  
entire  system  of  financial  controls  at  the  heart  of  indicative  planning.71  In  Japan,  deregulation  proceeded  
more  slowly,  but  financial  deregulation  permitted  firms  to  divert  investment  funds  into  land  and  stock  
market  speculation.  Successful  planning  and  export  drives  gave  firms  the  capacity  to  self-­‐finance  out  of  
retained  earnings,  rather  than  relying  on  the  state’s  offer  of  contingent  finance.  Facing  limited  export  
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growth,  they  turned  to  speculation  rather  than  reinvestment  for  growth.  Both  signaled  the  end  of  the  
supermodel,  even  as  a  second  generation  of  popular  books  errantly  heralded  the  Japanese  century.72  
Second,  the  fallacy  of  composition  around  demand  reemerged  at  the  global  level.  Emulation  of  
the  Japanese  model  eroded  Japan’s  supremacy  from  below  and  from  above  by  exhausting  global  
demand.  Developmental  states  in  Korea  and  Taiwan  competed  with  Japanese  firms  in  commodity  lines  
of  business,  while  US  firms  shifted  into  more  innovation-­‐intensive  product  lines.  Although  discretionary  
control  over  finance  gave  MITI  a  mighty  lever  to  extract  compliance  from  mass  production  firms  seeking  
to  move  to  the  technology  frontier,  it  was  a  less  supple  tool  for  moving  the  technology  frontier  outward.  
Meanwhile,  in  mass  production,  assembly  line  based  industry,  US  firms  assimilated  enough  of  the  
‘toyota  model’  to  retain  or  regain  market  share.73  This  pressured  Japanese  manufacturing  firms.  Slower  
global  demand  growth  in  the  context  of  lifetime  employment  systems  implied  gradually  rising  
overstaffing  as  productivity  growth  exceeded  market  growth.  
The  final  source  of  breakdown  in  the  developmental  state  supermodel  came  on  the  moral  or  
normative  side  of  the  bureaucracy.  Critics  argued  that  Johnson’s  masterful  bureaucracy  had  
degenerated  into  turf  wars,  political  gridlock,  and  an  uncompetitive  convoy  capitalism.74  Loriaux  
similarly  noted  the  breakdown  of  the  Ecole  Nationale  d’Administration-­‐derived  moral  orientation  behind  
French  indicative  planning  as  private  sector  pathologies  over  pay,  pointless  expansion  by  firms,  and  real  
conflicts  over  market  share  infected  ex-­‐bureaucrats  parachuted  into  the  private  sector.75  Successful  
firms  began  hiring  bureaucrats  to  influence  the  bureaucracy,  reversing  the  flow  of  influence  that  
amakudari  and  pantouflage  generated.  
The  Japanese  economy  remained  a  manufacturing  and  exporting  powerhouse,  but  stagnated  
after  1990.  Its  share  of  global  GDP  inexorably  shrank,  and  its  firms  increasingly  moved  production  
overseas.  From  1991  to  2016,  Japan’s  share  of  global  GDP  fell  by  50  percent,  while  gross  fixed  capital  
formation  fell  roughly  12  percent  in  real  terms.76  Meanwhile  the  United  States  enjoyed  a  second  15  
minutes  of  fame  as  a  supermodel  in  the  late  1990s.  This  provoked  a  new  polarity  already  foreshadowed  
by  Michel  Albert’s  Capitalisme  contra  Capitalisme.77  While  we  cannot  delve  into  the  first  round  of  this  
polarity,  which  pitted  the  American  ‘jobs  machine’  against  European  ‘flexicurity,’  we  turn  to  the  full  
formalization  of  this  polarity  in  the  VoC  literature.  
  
Varieties  of  Capitalism  
Varieties  of  Capitalism  (VoC)  completed  CPE’s  journey  from  macro  to  micro  and  from  demand-­‐  to  
supply-­‐side  sources  of  growth.  VoC  formalized  and  grounded  Albert’s  counterpoised  Anglo-­‐American  
and  Rhenish  economies.  VoC  asked  how  two  different  (and  stylized)  political  economies  overcame  
coordination  problems  in  the  extended  division  of  labor  characterizing  contemporary  economies.  It  thus  
moved  away  from  Shonfield’s  focus  on  management  of  the  macro-­‐economy,  corporatism’s  focus  on  
containment  of  inflation,  and  the  developmental  state’s  focus  on  state  organized  export-­‐led  growth,  to  
the  management  of  individual  people  and  firms,  as  in  standard  micro-­‐economics.  And  as  in  standard  
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micro-­‐economics,  it  built  up  to  the  macro  from  micro-­‐level  actors,  namely  firms  and  workers,  rather  
than  having  a  more  Keynesian  view  of  macro.  
By  emphasizing  variety,  VoC  pushed  back  against  mindless  globalization  arguments  suggesting  
convergence  around  a  single,  market-­‐based  model.  VoC  thus  carried  over  flexicurity  arguments  that  a  
corporatist  path  was  possible  and  that  some  welfare  state  programs  enhanced  competitiveness.  But  VoC  
did  so  using  principal-­‐agent  theories  anchored  in  micro-­‐economics.  VoC  explicitly  moved  firms  to  center  
stage,  displacing  unions’  role  in  the  early  corporatism  analyses.78  This  reflected  the  real  shift  in  social  
and  labor  market  power  towards  firms  and  capital  in  the  1990s.  The  use  of  the  new  economics  of  
organization  in  principle  should  not  have  limited  VoC  to  two  models.  Masahiko  Aoki,  for  example,  used  
the  same  tools  to  develop  multiple  models.79  But  despite  this  potential  for  variety,  VoC  carried  the  
original  markets  versus  hierarchies  dichotomy  in  Williamson  over  into  its  argument,  positing  two  ideal  
typical  and  internally  coherent  models.80  
VoC  built  off  the  central  problem  formalized  by  Williamson  and  Aoki:  if  markets  were  so  
efficient,  why  did  we  have  firms?  Actors  obviously  could  coordinate  via  arm’s  length  transaction  in  
markets.  Why  do  so  through  other  mechanisms?  Transaction  costs  around  writing  and  enforcing  
contracts  in  general  (Coase)  and  especially  around  contracts  involving  specific  assets  (Williamson)  led  
entrepreneurs  to  seek  control  over  those  assets  (and  workers)  rather  than  simply  purchasing  them  in  
the  market.81  VoC  translated  this  dichotomy  into  a  world  of  arm’s-­‐length,  market  based  interaction  and  
a  world  of  strategic  coordination  (not  hierarchy)  at  the  meso-­‐level.  Different  combinations  of  arm’s  
length  and  strategic  interaction  produced  different  divisions  of  labor  and  thus  different  pathways  to  
growth  and  employment  outcomes.  In  particular,  motivating  individuals  to  invest  in  firm-­‐specific  human  
capital  assets,  and  firms  to  invest  in  other  specific  assets  required  strategic  coordination  outside  the  
market.    
This  approach  produced  two  model  economies,  a  transaction-­‐based  liberal  market  economy  
(LME)  and  an  organized  coordinated  market  economy  (CME),  which  in  turn  mapped  onto  stylized  
understandings  of  the  United  States  and  Germany.  Each  had  different  ways  of  overcoming  five  central  
coordination  problems  around  production,  namely  vocational  training,  corporate  governance,  inter-­‐firm  
relations,  firms’  relations  with  their  own  employees,  and  industrial  relations.  But  in  essence  these  are  
five  supply-­‐side  issues:    the  production  of  labor  inputs,  the  provision  (but  not  production)  of  investment  
capital,  the  provision  (but  not  production)  of  non-­‐labor  inputs  and  standards,  management  of  
production  and  potential  conflicts  around  production  inside  the  firm,  and  the  management  of  the  
relationship  between  productivity  and  wages  (and  thus  class  conflict)  at  the  macro-­‐economic  level.  VoC  
thus  did  not  completely  abandon  the  macro-­‐economic  concerns  that  animated  Shonfield  and  the  neo-­‐
corporatists.  But  the  bulk  of  its  concerns  arise  from  micro-­‐economics  and  especially  from  principal-­‐agent  
dilemmas  that  deter  asset  specific  investment.82  VoC  sees  institutions  through  the  lens  of  game  theory,  
and  thus  has  a  methodologically  individualistic  theoretical  perspective.  Despite  this  focus,  VoC  carries  
over  from  the  first  round  of  corporatist  literature  a  concern  for  shared  understanding,  ala  Katzenstein.83  
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Strategic  interactions  among  actors  produce  not  just  outcomes,  but  durable  understandings  of  the  social  
meaning  of  those  outcomes.  This  is  what  produces  the  (thin?)  legitimacy  of  the  institutions  VoC  studies.  
VoC  privileges  neither  LMEs  nor  CMEs,  but  rather  argues  that  their  degree  of  success  rests  on  
the  degree  of  internal  complementarity  among  their  various  institutions.  A  hire-­‐fire  regime  will  not  be  
conducive  to  the  production  of  diversified  quality  goods;  a  system  of  gradually  rising  wages  in  the  
context  of  lifetime  employment  at  one  firm  will  not  be  conducive  to  radical  innovation.  Equally  so,  banks  
interested  in  the  recovery  of  capital  via  interest  payments  made  possible  by  an  on-­‐going  firm’s  sales  in  
product  markets  will  not  thrive  in  an  open  securities  market,  while  venture  capital  firms  interested  in  
the  recovery  and  multiplication  of  capital  via  initial  public  offerings  will  find  such  IPOs  difficult  where  
firms  and  banks  prefer  organic  growth.  Mismatches  produce  unemployment,  slow  growth  or  inflation.84  
Despite  much  creative  work  in  the  paradigm,  VoC  is  anchored  in  an  analysis  of  manufacturing  
firms.  Indeed,  the  very  point  of  view  adopted  is  that  of  a  manufacturing  firm  dealing  with  suppliers,  
borrowing  in  markets,  and  upgrading  (or  not)  its  workforce.  Without  forcing  things  too  much,  one  could  
say  that  the  paradigmatic  VoC  analysis  shows  how  employers  and  employees  cooperate  to  create  and  
maintain  a  skilled  male  manufacturing  labor  force  using  jointly  controlled  educational  and  social  welfare  
institutions.  In  this  supply  side  story,  welfare  exists  to  induce  and  preserve  skills,  not  to  stabilize  
aggregate  income  or  provide  dignity.  This  is  a  micro-­‐institutional,  micro-­‐founded  story,  in  which  meso-­‐  
and  micro-­‐corporatist  organizations  are  the  actors.  Growth  comes  from  an  aggregation  of  actor  
behaviors  that  produces  complementary  institutions.  And  it  is  a  manufacturing  story,  with  cultural  
production,  formal  intellectual  property  rights,  and  household  labor  largely  offstage.  
As  with  the  earlier  supermodels,  VoC’s  premises  blinded  it  to  the  contradictions  emerging  from  
the  economic  system  it  was  trying  to  explain.  Institutional  complementarity  undoubtedly  accounted  for  
successful  economic  specialization  and  perhaps  for  some  economic  growth  in  VoC’s  iconic  cases.  But  
demand-­‐side  growth  impulses  at  the  level  of  the  global  economy  dominated  VoC’s  era.  US  growth  in  the  
1990s  and  2000s  was  predicated  on  cheap  oil,  cheap  Chinese  wages,  and  cheap  mortgage  credit  in  the  
United  States;  the  era  of  rising  German  trade  surpluses  was  premised  on  US  and  Chinese  economic  
synergy.85  Without  roughly  $3.8  trillion  of  home  equity  withdrawal  by  and  $8  trillion  in  home  equity-­‐
generated  wealth  effects  for  American  homeowners  from  2000  to  2006,  would  China  have  made  so  
many  physical  exports  to  the  United  States  using  machinery  made  in  Germany?  And  while  VoC  is  alert  to  
the  symbiotic  relationship  among  different  sorts  of  production  systems  for  different  sorts  of  goods86,  it  
commits  the  fallacy  of  composition  in  thinking  that,  for  example,  German  export  specialization  in  
differentiated  quality  production  could  exist  in  the  absence  of  US  financialization,  income  inequality  and  
debt-­‐fueled  consumption.    
Given  its  premises,  VoC  could  at  most  conceive  of  a  financial  crisis  as  something  that  might  
affect  LMEs  on  account  of  their  arms’  length  financial  systems.  As  with  economics,  which  wrote  both  
finance  and  housing  out  of  its  micro-­‐founded  DSGE  models,  VoC  only  sees  finance  as  being  material  in  
relation  to  manufacturing,  and  has  nothing  to  say  about  housing  or  consumption  more  generally.  VoC  
simply  cannot  explain  why  the  German  Landesbanks  or  for  that  matter  banks  like  Deutschebank  were  
busy  speculating  in  the  US  subprime  mortgage  asset  market  or  southern  European  housing  markets  
rather  than  providing  patient  capital  to  the  mittelstand.  Nor  can  VoC  really  explain  why  housing  markets  
were  the  focal  point  for  (misconceived)  credit  creation.  
                                               
84  See  John  Campbell  and  Ove  Pedersen,  “The  Varieties  of  Capitalism  and  Hybrid  Success:  Denmark  in  the  Global  
Economy,”  Comparative  Political  Studies  40,  no.  3  (2007):  307-­‐332  for  a  dissent.  
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VoC  similarly  has  difficulty  dealing  with  China’s  emergence  as  an  uber-­‐developmental  state,  
whose  export  surpluses  on  average  rivaled  those  of  Japan  as  a  percentage  of  global  GDP,  and  exceeded  
them  by  a  comfortable  margin  at  their  height.  Japan  aside,  CPE’s  focus  on  developed  economies  makes  
it  rather  euro-­‐centric.  Though  VoC  explicitly  sets  out  only  to  explain  developed  economies,87  one  of  its  
core  implications  is  that  complementarity  exists  not  only  within  economies  but  also  across  them.  VoC  
explains  the  origins  of  comparative  advantage,  of  why  economies  specialize  in  the  export  of  specific  
kinds  of  goods.  But  China  does  not  fit  VoC’s  dichotomous  categories  and  is  not  complementary  in  global  
markets.  Its  exports  range  from  labor-­‐intensive  garments  to  technology  intensive  telecommunications  
and  high  speed  trains.  This  seems  problematic,  given  that  China  on  open  market  exchange  rates  is  larger  
than  the  five  biggest  EU  economies,  and  thus  a  candidate  for  supermodel  status  and  perhaps  global  
hegemon.  VoC  has  trouble  explaining  what  institutional  complementarities  make  China’s  ambitious  
Made  in  China  2025  a  threat  to  Germany’s  Industrie  4.0  ambitions.88  
VoC’s  various  blindnesses  emerge  from  its  supply  side  and  tradeables  foci,  from  its  loss  of  sight  
of  the  fallacy  of  composition  around  exports.  VoC’s  supply-­‐side  focus  explained  how  different  national  
subsystems  brought  different  goods  to  market,  not  how  those  goods  found  sufficient  monetary  demand  
on  the  other  side  of  the  transaction.  And  while  VoC  plausibly  sees  the  global  complementarity  between  
CME  exports  and  LME  imports  of  high  quality  goods,  it  cannot  specify  the  actual  sources  of  demand  for  
those  goods.  VoC’s  focus  on  complementary  national  subsystems,  and  complementarity  of  supply,  
blinds  it  to  the  way  in  which  Chinese  and  German  recycling  of  American  trade  deficits  flowed  into  US  
and  southern  European  housing  markets  and  thus  generated  additional  demand  at  the  level  of  the  
global  economy.89  In  short,  losing  sight  of  the  fallacy  of  composition  around  demand  creation  puts  
phenomena  like  the  cash  out  of  American  home  equity  outside  the  circle  of  light  cast  by  VoC’s  
manufacturing  oriented  lamppost.    
These  weaknesses  matter.  The  strikes  Shonfield  failed  to  predict  emerged  endogenously  from  
collective  bargaining  systems  that  accommodated  planners’  needs  more  than  the  day-­‐to-­‐day  needs  of  
people  as  workers.  VoC  as  an  analytic  paradigm  emerged  just  as  financialization  became  the  dominant  
phenomenon  in  global  economic  growth,  and  just  as  (mostly  American)  housing  finance  became  one  of  
the  major  sources  of  new  demand  in  the  world  economy.  The  2008  financial  crash  emerged  from  a  
deepening  global  division  of  labor  in  which  a  politically  generated  balancing  of  supply  and  demand  
inside  national  economies  had  given  way  to  VoC’s  complementary  production  systems  that  balanced  
supply  and  demand  at  neither  the  national  nor  global  level.  
Today’s  functional  equivalent  of  Shonfield’s  strikes  is  the  rise  of  mass  anti-­‐system  parties  
everywhere.  This  rise  is  deeply  rooted  in  identity  issues  that  make  emotional  reactions  to  the  
disappearance  of  a  preferred  social  order  the  basis  for  voting  choices.  But  equally  so,  anti-­‐system  parties  
arise  from  the  massive  outsourcing  to  low  wage  economies  that  firms  in  both  LMEs  and  CMEs  have  done  
over  the  past  three  decades.  Outsourcing  by  price  sensitive  LME  firms  fits  comfortably  within  VoC’s  
explanatory  framework.  This  is  not  so  for  firms  in  CMEs,  who  by  definition  are  not  competing  over  price.  
VoC  has  no  ability  to  see  the  demand  side  of  the  economy,  the  workings  of  the  global  macro-­‐economy,  
or  common  patterns  that  cross  over  its  two  types.  
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CPE  had  a  double  cognitive  failure  in  the  2000s.  It  missed  the  dynamics  leading  to  the  2008+  
global  financial  crises  and  the  subsequent  secular  stagnation  because  its  analytic  strategies  steadily  
shifted  from  a  macro-­‐economic  and  macro-­‐actor  orientation  to  a  micro-­‐economic,  micro-­‐actor  
orientation.  Its  explanandum  shifted  from  the  demand-­‐side  to  the  supply-­‐side  and  from  more  
sociological  models  of  legitimacy  to  more  instrumental  bargaining  models.  A  succession  of  ideal  models  
for  economic  governance  –  supermodels  –  instantiated  this  shift.  This  analytic  shift  was  not  
fundamentally  flawed.  It  yielded  interesting  and  useful  insights  about  the  inner  dynamics  of  firms  and  
complexes  of  firms.  Yet  the  transition  from  macro-­‐  to  micro-­‐  meant  that  CPE  was  unable  to  see  how  
these  better  understood  discrete  pieces  fit  together  into  a  whole,  in  effect  pushing  the  fallacy  of  
composition  away  from  the  lamppost  of  research.  Every  research  paradigm  brings  some  set  of  
phenomena  to  the  foreground  by  pushing  others  into  darkness.    
Each  step  from  Shonfield  toward  VoC  shed  part  of  earlier  authors’  macro  and  demand-­‐side  
perspectives.  The  corporatism  literature  moved  from  Shonfield’s  concern  with  the  generation  of  
demand  through  organized  collective  bargaining  to  the  limitation  of  demand  through  wage  restraint  by  
delving  into  union  organization  and  central  banking.  The  developmental  state  literature  moved  from  
planning  as  a  social  enterprise  to  planning  as  a  technical  enterprise  by  delving  into  planning  ministries  
and  specific  control  mechanisms.  The  micro-­‐economic  perspective  that  came  to  fruition  in  VoC  
highlighted  individual  (and  firm)  decisions  around  asset  specific  investments  and  thus  explained  national  
differences  in  the  supply  of  factors,  and  thence  differences  in  the  supply  of  goods  from  different  
countries.    
VoC  thus  re-­‐unified  the  planning  and  bargaining  strands  emerging  from  Shonfield’s  original  
analysis,  albeit  at  a  micro-­‐economic  level  rather  than  a  macro-­‐economic  one.  By  reuniting  them  at  a  
micro-­‐economic  level,  VoC  lost  sight  of  the  fallacy  of  composition  around  the  sources  of  demand  in  the  
markets  that  its  supply-­‐side  actors  provisioned.  In  this  movement,  VoC  followed  trends  in  mainstream  
economics;  the  Hall  and  Soskice  volume  has  only  two  references  to  Keynes.  Equally  so,  VoC  missed  the  
sources  of  the  populist  political  movement  that  had  been  building  before  2008  but  exploded  thereafter.  
VoC’s  focus  on  pareto  optimal  equilibria  took  for  granted  stability  in  employment  and  demand,  only  to  
be  surprised  when  the  large  parts  of  the  population  revolted  against  stable  equilibria  that  disadvantaged  
them.  
More  generally,  the  flow  from  Shonfield  to  VoC  reflected  a  globalization  driven  shift  in  thinking  
about  employment  and  growth  away  from  a  ‘we’re  all  in  this  together’  mentality  towards  a  
competitiveness  frame.  Capital  and  foreign  exchange  controls  allowed  Shonfield’s  desynchronized  
economies  to  help  each  other  balance  supply  and  demand.  Financial  globalization  has  synchronized  
economies  and  facilitated  the  growing  trade  and  thus  debt  imbalances  beneath  the  recent  financial  
crises.  Keynes  had  already  tried  to  pre-­‐empt  this  problem  at  Bretton  Woods  by  proposing  the  
International  Clearing  Union  as  a  mechanism  for  bringing  global  demand  and  supply  into  balance.  
These  intellectual  shifts  are  not  irreversible,  and  indeed,  CPE  was  responsive  to  phenomena  that  
thrust  themselves  into  the  circle  of  light  cast  by  each  of  its  supermodel  lampposts.  The  decade  of  slow  
growth  following  the  2008  crash  has  ignited  a  new  debate  about  secular  stagnation.90  Secular  stagnation  
is,  by  definition,  a  demand-­‐side  problem,  and  we  would  expect  attention  to  return  to  macro-­‐economic,  
demand-­‐side  considerations,  and  to  how  the  distribution  of  income  affects  demand.  The  green  shoots  of  
such  an  orientation  are  already  visible  in  the  stony  landscape  of  the  otherwise  micro-­‐economically  
oriented  CPE  field.  Peter  Hall  provides  a  literally  paradigmatic  example,  insofar  as  his  entire  life  cycle  of  
work  stretches  from  Shonfield  to  secular  stagnation,  with  station  stops  at  corporatism,  central  banking,  
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and  VoC.  Hall’s  earliest  work  in  essence  grappled  with  the  ideological,  ideational,  and  legitimacy  
components  of  Shonfield’s  Modern  Capitalism.  Hall’s  recent  work  returns  to  the  themes  present  in  
Shonfield,  asking  about  the  political  bases  for  adequate  economic  governance,  and  the  importance  of  
finding  new  sources  of  demand  in  a  world  with  increasingly  unequal  incomes.91    
Two  other  promising  shoots  are  parts  of  the  financialization  literature  and  the  rediscovery  of  
Michał  Kalecki  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Keynes.  These  literatures  are  explicitly  macro-­‐economic.  The  best  
of  the  financialization  literature  elucidates  problems  of  modern  capitalism  on  all  three  levels  of  analysis  
–  individuals,  firms,  and  macro-­‐economy  –  without  falling  into  methodological  individualism  or  a  supply-­‐
side  orientation.92  These  analyses  help  us  understand  how  the  transfer  of  risk  to  individuals,  the  rise  of  
value-­‐extracting  rather  than  value-­‐generating  forms  of  corporate  governance,  and  debt-­‐fueled  growth  
models  led  to  slower  growth.  Similarly,  Baccaro  and  Pontusson,  among  others,  have  revived  Kalecki’s  
juxtaposition  of  wage-­‐led  and  profit-­‐led  growth  models.93  Wage-­‐led  models  are  of  course  a  demand-­‐side  
approach,  and  income  inequality  is  a  prime  cause  of  weakening  political  legitimacy  in  the  rich  
economies.  Indeed,  Baccaro  and  Pontusson  forthrightly  call  for  a  re-­‐think  of  CPE’s  main  model:94  
In  contrast  to  the  [VoC]  approach,  our  approach  emphasizes  the  demand-­‐side  of  the  
economy  and  focuses  on  trajectories  of  change  in  the  post-­‐Fordist  era.  We  identify  
different  ‘growth  models’  based  on  the  relative  importance  of  household  consumption  
and  exports  and  the  dynamic  relationship(s)  between  these  components  of  aggregate  
demand.  
These  analyses  argue  that  wage-­‐led  growth  models  probably  deliver  superior  economic  growth  as  well  
as  better  outcomes  in  terms  of  income  equality.  Even  so,  these  arguments  understate  the  importance  of  
global  demand  for  generating  growth  in  what  are  still  seen  as  national  economies.  This  is  a  problem  of  
the  global  and  not  just  the  national  distribution  of  income.  
Alas,  while  these  new  ways  of  approaching  current  economic  problems  return  to  older,  more  
political  ways  of  thinking  about  the  problem,  we  lack  an  empirical  supermodel,  precisely  because  no  one  
has  sorted  out  institutional  solutions  to  the  problems  of  inequality  and  unbalanced  global  demand.  CPE,  
as  always,  is  a  follower,  not  a  leader  in  understanding  the  reorganization  of  the  economy.  But  
Shonfield’s  concerns  about  the  need  to  simultaneously  boost  wages  and  investment  in  a  politically  
legitimate  way  remain  as  valid  as  ever.  So  what  is  lacking  is  not  ideas,  but  rather,  a  politics  that  can  
create  a  more  stable  modern  capitalism  based  on  rising  wages  and  aggregate  demand.  
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